Pakistan proposes and India disposes

Ever since the ceasefire almost two years ago along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, speculation has been rife on a) whether this ceasefire would finally result in the brokering of a lasting peace between the two neighbours; b) what would be the nature of a final solution and c) how long would it take for this solution to materialize? Besides this, there has always been the constant worry over India’s threshold for cross border terrorism and whether or not it would succeed in derailing this peace process.

India’s focus since the ceasefire has been to keep Pakistan engaged on two fronts – one, by ensuring continued dialogue on a number of fronts in the form of confidence building measures and two, engaging with Islamabad on Kashmir specific issues. The results for both have been significant. The former has helped bridge the trust discrepancy between the two neighbours and the latter has aided in highlighting the two neighbours ability to work on contentious bilateral issues. The difference between India and Pakistan however has been over the pace with which the two countries approach discussions. For India, the developments should be gradual, a point indicative in its stand for first building trust through CBM’s, whereas for Pakistan an earlier resolution to this issue seems acceptable.

The disclosure that Pakistani Prime Minister had made a proposal for self-governance along the sidelines of the SAARC summit to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had only increased speculation about the aforementioned three questions. It is another matter of course that the Indian side dismissed the proposal, albeit on grounds of official modalities. But before one considers the reasons behind New Delhi’s rejection of the proposal, the ‘Musharraf proposal’ as it is being called must be studied.

This is not the first time that President Musharraf has made statements on what would constitute a viable solution for Kashmir. In fact approximately a year back he had made proposals that called for the identification of seven regions from the erstwhile state – two in Pakistan and five in India – which would then be demilitarized and their status changed. This proposal was summarily rejected by India because it would have meant the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines. A year on, the proposal from Pakistan does not seem all that much different. The Musharraf proposal in essence calls for the division of the state into five geographical entities, demilitarizing them and according them maximum self-governance. Thus besides the reduction in the number of regions that needed to be demilitarized, the new addition in this proposal is the concept of self-governance. In fact the roots for this new proposal can be found in the US based Kashmir Study Group’s report of February 2005 on solutions for Kashmir. The report of 2005 is itself a departure from its report released in 2000 wherein it had called for the division of the state into 7 regions – a concept now popularized through President Musharraf’s suggestion.

On the face of things, it appears that the new proposal cannot be dismissed so easily since the projected self-governance probably comes closest to New Delhi’s stated desire of extending ‘maximum self-autonomy’ to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But there remain numerous reasons for India to reject this proposal from Pakistan.

For one, even if the proposal calls for the establishment of five and not seven entities, the division in Jammu and Kashmir would still take on communal overtones. In the previous proposal, the division of the regions was along religious lines was overt. If considered, the new proposal still manages the division of the state into a Muslim Kashmir, a Hindu Jammu and a Buddhist Ladakh. This arrangement would never be acceptable to New Delhi in any eventuality. Secondly, the increased infiltration from across the border, in the wake of the devastating earthquake and especially in the face of India’s aid to Pakistan, has not helped bridge the trust factor. To acknowledge a proposed solution in the face of increased infiltration would negate India’s stand on cross border terrorism and portray New Delhi as weak. Thirdly, the call for demilitarization of the region, as the proposal suggests can never materialize if cross border terrorism continues. So the actions from across the border contradict the proposal themselves. Fourthly, India’s stand on soft borders would at least ensure its continued sovereignty over the state – a concept not possible under the proposal. Lastly, the proposal still does not take into account the wishes of the people from Jammu and Ladakh – two of the three regions from India – who have consistently called for greater integration with New Delhi.

Thus from all conceivable angles, a proposal in this form, could never be accepted by India. However, New Delhi will soon need to devise its own framework for a solution rather than merely rejecting a formal submission of one from Islamabad especially since reports from Pakistan suggest that President Musharraf is in no hurry to yield on this ‘solution’ any time soon.

Why a peaceful resolution to Kashmir seems improbable

It would not be fair to term Syed Salahuddin's statements on Kashmir as the official Pakistan policy. But the fact that Salahuddin has been making, rather freely, statements on Kashmir, which seem to be contrary to the stance taken by Islamabad-at least for the time being-is a clear pointer to Pakistan's strategy on Kashmir.

The first is to adopt a calibrated, if crude, flip-flop approach to the "K" issue. The second is to make diplomatically correct statements on Kashmir. Third, to keep the issue alive on a third front by letting people of all hues, from terrorists to commentators, to keep talking and writing about Kashmir. Pakistan has been quite successful in this approach. Kashmir, by and large, without being on the agenda of the SAARC conference, remained, throughout the past three days, the central theme of nuances, posturing and statements. Islamabad had fielded two players in this game. One official, another demi-official. Syed Salahuddin, the chief of Hizbul Mujahideen and the head of United Jihad Council, was the proxy. The official one was Pakistan's Information and Broadcasting Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad. Salahuddin has been holding forth on Kashmir rather vigorously since the peace initiative had begun. He clarified his views on the issue in a signed article in Nawa-i-Waqt and Ausaf, two of the most influential Urdu newspapers in Pakistan, a few days before the SAARC summit. He wrote there could be no peace in the world without solving the issue of Kashmir. He said the mujahideen should be given due credit for keeping the Kashmir struggle alive. He praised President Musharraf for extending moral and material support for the struggle and added, Pakistan should not make the past mistake of letting the people of Kashmir down by signing agreements like the Shimla Accord or Lahore Declaration. He said he was sure that President Musharraf would not let the people of Kashmir (read jihadis) down this time.

On January 5, 2004, on the second day of the summit, the Hizb leader said the SAARC nations should not ignore the ground realities and take steps to resolve the Kashmir issue "in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiris". He said that was the only path to peace. If Salahuddin was the only one making such noises, it would have been sensible to ignore him and his histrionics. But his official counterpart, Information and Broadcasting Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, too, has been echoing the same sentiments for quite some time.

On January 2, speaking to the media (reported in Ausaf) about the preparations for the SAARC conference, Mr. Rashid Ahmad said Kashmir was a question of life and death for Kashmiris. This statement was remarkably similar to the one made by President Pervez Musharraf sometime back, when he said Kashmir "runs in our blood". The Pakistanis do not even change the script. It would not be surprising if one were to look at what Mr. Rashid Ahmad has been saying in the run up to the SAARC conference. On December 23, for instance, speaking on behalf of President Musharraf, he declared that Pakistan was committed to resolving the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Talking to the Associated Press of Pakistan, the official news agency of that country, he said the President reiterated that Pakistan has a firm commitment to its principled position on Kashmir dispute. He quoted the President assuring a delegation of Kashmiri leaders that Pakistan would give due regard to the aspirations of the Kashmiri people whenever there is progress towards resolution of the Kashmir dispute. On January 5, the Minister said "the way leading to normalcy in India-Pakistan relations is passing through Kashmir" (Indian Express, January 6, 2004). Saying that friendship was in the mutual interest of India and Pakistan, he said the objective can be achieved only if the Kashmir issue was addressed.

Jang, a widely read English newspaper in Pakistan, quoted Mr. Rashid (Jan 6) as stating: "The issue of Kashmir involves three parties including India, Pakistan and Kashmiris. So the concerns of all parties have to be addressed to have a sustainable solution of the lingering dispute." He said the people of Kashmir have waited over a half-century for the solution of their problem and it will be unjust to make them wait further. Put these statements together and it would be easier to locate the common thread. Both are talking in the same vein. What they are saying is this: Peace is fine but not at the cost of Kashmir. It means the terror campaign would not be over. In fact, my suspicion is that the Army-jihadi network is already busy setting up new camps, pushing in weapons and explosives and training new recruits for renewed violence in Kashmir, once the hyped bonhomie of SAARC is over and India gears up for elections in spring. This is the time for the snow-bound passes to thaw. Remember 1999. There was similar hype, hoopla and declarations of friendship while General Musharraf was sending in his troops camouflaged as intruders.

There are indications this time round too about Pakistan's intentions in the near future. Don't hear, listen. Listen to what the General and his brigade is not saying. One, they are not saying there should not be terrorism in Kashmir. They are not even mentioning the word "terrorism".

For a country which is supposedly working with the United States in a war on terrorism, this amnesia is a matter of concern but not exactly unexpected. As the General said early this year at the United Nations, there was only "indigenous struggle" going on in Kashmir. Though everyone thought it appropriate to talk about the people of Kashmir, no one paid even a lip service to the hundreds and thousands of innocent civilians killed in Kashmir. They too were Kashmiris.

So which Kashmiri welfare is the General and his brigade talking about? Second, peace has become a catch word in Pakistan. From militant to the military, every one is talking about peace in south Asia. But, and here is the catchword, if only India could settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Hear Salahuddin or Mr Rashid or General Musharraf. That is the common refrain. The Pakistani propaganda machine has achieved another success. By provoking India to take an aggressive stance two years ago, Pakistan turned Kashmir into an international issue.

Now, it has queered the pitch by suffixing 'peace' to Kashmir. There would be peace if the Kashmir issue could be resolved. And the issue will only be resolved if India sits across the table with Pakistan to decide the fate of Kashmir. What should be our reaction? Shake hands with the General. Smile to the cameras. Talk peace. And ignore the bait. Don't react. Be extra alert at our borders. Plan a counter-proxy strategy for this summer. This would be a hot summer on, and inside, the Line of Control.

Mission Kashmir….well almost!

If anyone ever thought that a solution to the Kashmir problem was around the corner, the events of the past week may well convince them to think again.

In light of the growing bonhomie between India and Pakistan, President Musharraf invited the leaders of the separatists conglomerate, the Hurriyat conference, to Pakistan for talks. The Hurriyat on its part was pleased at the invitation it had received. For them it meant an increased role and greater prominence in any bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan. In fact, the Hurriyat had insisted on visiting Pakistan before resuming talks with India. For India, the visit of the Kashmiri separatist leaders to PoK, in the peace bus, would have translated into a fantastic public relations exercise. Symbolism travels a long way in politics and nothing would have been more symbolic and supportive of India’s recent initiatives on Kashmir than this. Unfortunately chaotic travels, contradicting statements and changing itineraries dominated the developments in the run up to the visit reflecting possibly the problems that hinder peace in the region.

The moderate Hurriyat leaders wanted this high profile visit to reassert their role in any dialogue on Kashmir, which may not be to New Delhi’s liking. For Pakistan, and especially President Musharraf, the visit would merely have been another opportunity to highlight their ‘support’ for the Kashmir cause. And this is where it all began to unravel, unfortunately, mostly for India.

The fact that the moderate leaders have indeed traveled from PoK to Islamabad, without legal travel documents, indicates the negation of India’s Kashmir policy. As opposed to New Delhi’s desire to have soft borders, the visit has instead prompted visions of alternative solutions wherein an autonomous state of Kashmir could be a possibility. In addition the bus service linking Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has been rendered completely irrelevant given the fact the Hurriyat leaders took all means of transport, excepting the bus, in their journeys. For instance instead of taking the peace bus to the Kaman bridge, the Hurriyat leaders opted instead to travel in their own cars to the last Indian outpost. These developments have to be seen against the background of India’s policy in the recent past when New Delhi had refused to even discuss the issue of Kashmir with the Hurriyat leaders, outside the purview of the Indian Constitution. It is not surprising that the Government has preferred to not comment on the Hurriyat’s visit and subsequent statements in Pakistan.

The events of the coming weeks would be even more interesting for all stakeholders. For the Government of India, dialogue with the Hurriyat leaders would probably be on the anvil upon their return and it would be interesting to see how the Government decides to approach the same. What would be even more important to note is the level at which the dialogue takes place, when it does. In the recent past when the Hurriyat had demanded direct consultations with the Prime Minister their request has not been acquiesced. Now with the Hurriyat returning from Pakistan, after holding face-to-face consultations with President Musharraf himself, India may have to consider a altering its strategy to regain some momentum in the changed scenario. After all it has become clear that if New Delhi does not court the Hurriyat, Islamabad would be more than willing to bridge the gap. The Hurriyat leaders on their part would be keen on making their presence felt as representatives of the Kashmiri people in New Delhi. Their only singular worry in a dialogue with India would be if no headway takes place in the dialogue process despite their visit.

In the midst of all the brouhaha there remains one tantalizingly interesting question to address – what means would the Mirwaiz and other Hurriyat leaders use to return to India and thereby Kashmir?

Centre and Hurriyat dialogue: Why now?

Days before the historic talks between the separatist amalgam, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference under the leadership of Maulana Ansari, and the Government of India, there is widespread speculation as to the outcome of the same. After all this is the first time that the Government of India has formally invited the APHC leaders for talks on Kashmir, a demand the latter has been making for a long time. So why agree to meet the APHC now, especially at a juncture when the status of talks with Pakistan on Kashmir, looks increasingly promising and therefore a more viable option? The nature and outcome of the talks can thus be predicted with almost a degree of certainty and here are the reasons why.

The primary reason to hold talks with APHC representatives is governed by the fact that in the past year or so the Government’s policy towards Kashmir has been dictated by its presence in the valley. There has been a concerted effort to showcase a different, more-friendly image, of the Union Government. The holding of the Inter State Chief Ministers Conference in Srinagar etc can be seen within the larger framework of promoting a more inclusive image of India per se; an image which includes Kashmir and Kashmiris in it. Thus the decision to engage the All Parties Hurriyat Conference for talks on Kashmir is not only unprecedented but also in line with their broader vision of promoting the Government’s presence, through alliances with mass based groups in the valley itself.

But why does the Government feel the urge to hold talks with the Hurriyat at this stage? There are two sides to the same issue which speak primarily of the compulsions facing the Government and the Hurriyat, rather than their collective desire to achieve a breakthrough. Their compulsions should be seen separately and then jointly to get a clear understanding of the reasons behind the talks.

For the Government of India emerging successfully from the talks with the Hurriyat would do more for the image for the BJP led NDA government in the upcoming general elections than anything else because of two reasons. For one successful talks with the Hurriyat would not result in a resolution on Kashmir but a possible resolution once the electoral process of 2004 is completed, could be proposed. This factor in itself would underscore the Government’s re election bid, for in order to achieve the breakthrough the BJP led NDA government would have to be reelected. In the same vein, as an electoral topic the holding of successful talks with the Hurriyat may well reflect the secular character of the Government as well. This is so because the talks would primarily showcase the sincerity of the Government’s efforts in resolving the Kashmir issue through successful engagement of the Hurriyat and Pakistan. Further, initiating a dialogue with the Hurriyat leadership is necessary as they are decidedly seen as being more moderate in their approach vis-à-vis the breakaway Geelani faction and therefore more open-minded.

Then there is the Hurriyat side of the coin. The APHC under Maulana Ansari’s leadership would want to appear reasonable yet principled in its stand on holding talks with the Government. As far as the latter case is concerned the Hurriyat’s principled position may be derived on the basis of three reasons. Firstly and primarily it may well arise from the acknowledgement of the fact that the Government would be faced with electoral compulsions to call the first such public dialogue with the separatist amalgam ‘a success’. Armed with this knowledge they may want to come to the talks with demands that are extreme from the Government’s point of view. After all any concessions that may be derived from the Government can be procured now. The success however would be in getting the Government of India to recognize the demands. Secondly, the APHC representatives would not want to appear as if they have sold out the interests of the Kashmiri people in New Delhi. Thirdly the representatives would also not want to appear ideologically weak towards the cause they propound, especially in light of the death threats that militant organisations have made towards them for having agreed to hold the talks.

Seen together there are compulsions on both sides to emerge successfully from the talks. There would be efforts, from both sides to find a common ground between them for a few reasons. For the Government it would be the desire to appear flexible and accommodating on the Kashmir front primarily so because they can push the claim through that they would be able to reach a consensus on the same if reelected. For the APHC on the other hand it would make sense to appear flexible yet hardline in their approach for two reasons. It is after all the first time the Government has heeded to their demands and agreed to hold a dialogue with representatives of the faction. As much as this meeting represents hope for the people of Kashmir it also represents the first time a component of the trilateral meet, desired by the APHC, would be realized. It would appear highly unlikely that the APHC, after having traversed this long road demanding talks, would want to return to status quo due to their failure to see eye to eye with the Government. Flexibility would thus mark their approach so that the continuity of talks is ensured.

After having observed the compulsions weighing on either side for entering into talks, it remains wise to hold off on expecting a breakthrough. Rather, what can be expected is a feel good factor emerging from the talks that would hopefully continue after the elections.

Talks with Pakistan: Feel good factor of a different kind?

In one of the most recent analytical pieces on this website it was very wisely quoted “Don't hear, listen. Listen to what is not being said” (sic) as regards the Indo – Pakistan peace talks and their decision to hold a composite dialogue. Thus ironically while most peaceniks, in Pakistan and India are hailing the recent thaw in relations it remains advisable to be cautiously optimistic for the time being. This opinion is not being proffered for the mere reason of being conservative as regards Indo – Pak initiatives towards peace in Kashmir. Rather this opinion is based upon media reports emerging from India and Pakistan which convey the compulsions and significance for both countries on this road to peace. When delineated they fall into three broad categories; the economics of peace, domestic compulsions and international pressures.

Up until September and the UN General Assembly any mention of bilateral talks were denied vehemently by both sides. Regularly stated arguments were resorted to at frequent intervals clearly belying any interest in the resolution of the Kashmir conundrum. However while all the parleys at the political level were discontinuing, at the economic level, the same were clearly intensifying. In September 2003 an India-Pakistan CEO’s Business Forum was launched by India’s Foreign Affairs minister Mr. Yashwant Sinha where he called for expanding bilateral trade between the two nations. Considering that unauthorized illegal trade between the two nations is estimated at $2 billion whereas legal trade is estimated to be a mere $200 – $250 million this proposal makes good economic sense. Pakistan follows a very restrictive trading regime versus India primarily as it links the issue of Kashmir with the normalization of any bilateral economic ties. Thus actual volumes of trade have always remained limited. Now however there appears to be a distinct change in the way issues are approached vis-à-vis Pakistan. It should be noted that this author had in a previous article mentioned the veritable fork in the road as far as bilateral relations with Pakistan is concerned. There is a willingness to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, a composite dialogue as it were, with Kashmir being only one of the issues for discussions. At the same time the political plane between New Delhi and Srinagar is being leveled to a certain extent with the decision to hold high level talks with separatist amalgamations. That Kashmir, the issue, has been relegated as a secondary cause in the bureaucratic lexicon of both India and Pakistan would be too early to declare. But one can definitely assert that it no longer remains the only issue for consideration for bettering bilateral ties. Thus would it be so difficult to imagine that the imperatives for peace with Pakistan, over Kashmir and any other outstanding issues may actually be determined via economic prospects and the accruable advantages of the same? That the economics of peace would play a major role in the times to come has also been ascertained by reports that suggest that trade and economic issues would be a priority for India and Pakistan in their composite dialogue rather than Kashmir. Then again the improved economic ties should not pose a problem in the long run. One can always cite the example of China and Taiwan. For all practical purposes and for all the razor edge tensions between the two nations, China and Taiwan still maintain healthy economic relations. In fact statistics reveal that bilateral trade for these two nations rose by 25% thereby exceeding US$50 billion this year. Thus despite increasing tensions trade volumes for Taiwan have been steadily increasing. The enormity of these statistics does not reflect the fact that up until a decade ago no formal economic relations existed between these two neighbours. The signing of the free trade agreement or SAFTA at Islamabad is an indication that both India and Pakistan are ready to trade with each other. Thus it would not be wrong to speculate that the current peace efforts were being dictated by the accruable economic advantages for India and Pakistan rather than at efforts to settle Kashmir. Were it so then it would truly mark a departure from previous efforts of this administration.

But the economic imperatives may not be the only factor leading up to the talks. For each of the leaders in India and Pakistan there are various factors at stake in initiating bilateral dialogue at this stage. For one there may be this inherently logical reasoning which calls into question the need for a dialogue at this particular hour. After two almost fatal attacks on his life why would President Musharraf agree to talks with India, an act which may further anger the very people being suspected of being the masterminds behind the attacks? It could be theorized that for President Musharraf the only way to defy the militants and simultaneously assert his authority maybe to change tack on India and thereby Kashmir. As radical as it does sound this may well be one of the reasons that have resulted in the coming together of Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf at Islamabad. Then again there may have been little maneuverability for President Musharraf especially when Mr. Vajpayee declared that this may be his last attempt at forging peace between the two warring neighbours. Alternatively, skepticism would be paramount as to the timing of the sudden change of heart. Facing increasing criticism on the charges that Pakistan has been proliferating nuclear technology to countries like Iran, Libya and North Korea; this may well be an opportune time to show a change of heart on an issue as contentious as Kashmir and thereby Pakistan and General Musharraf’s sincerity in resolving other outstanding issues.

Similarly in India talks on Kashmir could well serve the electoral and policy compulsions of the NDA government. Speculations are awash in the media about the now almost certain postponement of general elections, initially slated for September 2004. Thus the peace talks with Pakistan on the one hand and the Hurriyat on the other would be shining examples of a ‘feel good’ factor of a different kind. Both when taken together will serve as an invaluable electoral manifesto that can promote the secularity of the BJP led NDA government. Fringe voters may thus be influenced on the apparent perception that peace with Pakistan and within Kashmir was possible after reelection.

When one insulates all the implications on a probable peace dialogue with Pakistan the recent peace forays tend to be understood better. The last such compelling factor for the peace initiatives may well have come from the American pressure on both nations to resolve the Kashmir issue or at least appear that they were close to resolving the same. Though not out rightly American presence and involvement in Kashmir has steadily and gradually been increasing. Statements from Mirwaiz Umer Farooq and Secretary of State Colin Powell himself have asserted that the United States has played an important role in facilitating the discussions between India and Pakistan. But to understand the extent of their involvement one just has to glance through the itinerary of diplomats visiting Kashmir in the past six odd months. The US deputy chief of missions and its current Charge d’ Affairs Robert-O-Blake was the first foreign dignitary to meet with the Chairman of the moderate Hurriyat faction in Srinagar. Besides a number of American delegates, from the State Department and otherwise had met and held consultations, with relevant groups, on Kashmir, in Delhi and Srinagar.

So this is what we have…the current peace initiatives when seen as a result of pressurizing economic, political and domestic compulsions. This author is of the fervent opinion that the Kashmir issue per se is not going to be resolved at least until after the general elections in which case a change of heart may well be expected on either sides. Thus for all those wanting to see more in these peace efforts than there is, a word of caution; be prepared for the worst.

Building Baglihar

Talks between India and Pakistan, on the construction of the Baglihar Dam, recently broke down in New Delhi after 4 days of intense discussions. Currently both countries are planning counter steps to protect their interests while trying to keep the dialogue route open. The stakes are high to resolve this issue and it is important to highlight why remaining engaged through diplomatic channels remains the most viable option available to both, India and Pakistan.

Pakistan, which was identified as the lower riparian when boundaries were redrawn during Partition, has much at stake in the continuation of Indus Waters Treaty. The 1960, World Bank arbitrated treaty gives Pakistan exclusive use of water from the rivers Indus, Chenab and Jhelum – all of which flow from India to Pakistan. India is however allowed to generate electricity from these rivers. Thus in 2000, India started building a two phase, 450 MW each, hydroelectric project on river Chenab. The site of the project is in southern Doda district of Chandrakot. Pakistan does not have an objection to the project per se but to the ‘design’ of the project. Pakistan is of the view that the design was not approved by both countries, as specified by the clauses of the treaty and that the construction of the dam would allow India to store and thereby control the flow of water into Pakistan.

While Indian officials summarily dismiss the validity of the above claims, there is no doubt that Pakistan’s long-term benefits lie in continuing within the ambit of the Indus Waters Treaty. If World Bank is indeed moved for arbitration, a consequent action may well be the annulment of the treaty. This would not bode well for an increasingly agrarian Pakistan economy dependent on the waters of these very rivers, especially in the province of Punjab. In addition two main dams in Pakistan – Mangla and Terbela – which receive and store water from melting snowcaps, have not even reached the average capacity level this past year. Rainfall too was lower than average in Pakistan last year. Thus if Pakistani officials are arguing that the construction of the dam may well result in a loss of almost 8000 cusecs of water each day, they must also acknowledge the reality of the above facts before approaching the World Bank for arbitration. Faced with the arguments, Pakistan should be prompted to continue in engaging with India.

India’s stake in the construction of the project and continuing with talks is equally if not more important. First and foremost are financial constraints. Even while talks between representatives of the two countries were collapsing, the Power Finance Corporation granted a sum of almost Rs. 1770 crores to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir for the construction of the dam. Even New Delhi recently set aside Rs. 630 crore for the continuation of the project. With the amount of money that has already been spent on the project there is obviously concern over the completion of the same. The government does not want to incur costs to the project through unnecessary delays and is also not keen on suspending the project at the stage that it is in. Secondly this project is important to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir and therefore to the Central government as this is the only power project owned by the former. In addition this project would help generate much needed electricity in a region, which already suffers from daylong power cuts.
It is important to bring in here the objections to the design of the dam as raised by Pakistan. India denies that the dam would be used for storing water thereby depriving Pakistan of its water resources. Lowering the height of the dam, as Pakistan suggests, would reduce the power producing capacity of the project to a mere 50 MW from the stated capacity of 450 MW of the project. This would reduce the viability of the project especially in light of the focus with which it is being built.

Most importantly however it is important that India continues to engage Pakistan through diplomatic channels because if the latter does indeed approach the World Bank for arbitration it would be indicative of the discussion of Kashmir – or at least an aspect of Kashmir - in an international forum. This is something that India should avoid at all costs.

Thus if one was to conclude that talks remain for now the most viable option for both India and Pakistan then thought must be extended to agreeable options that may be approved by both countries. The first option would indubitably be to convince Pakistan of the benefits of the project, especially for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Another option maybe for India to extend a ‘water and electricity’ sharing deal with Pakistan thereby allowing the construction and eventual functioning of the project. Eventually however it must be acknowledged by both countries that dialogue would be a far better option than any unilateral action that either India or Pakistan may pursue.

Kashmir: New Hope?

The Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision to have Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani as the new person to be heading the talks with separatist outfits raises several questions. What had prompted the Government to finally involve a separatist outfit at the level of talks that the latter have been demanding for so long? And then what would be the status of talk’s vis-à-vis Pakistan especially after this peace initiative? This is an attempt to find out where this latest peace overture would leave us?

If one were to see the peace initiatives, against the backdrop of previous efforts by the Indian Government, then a distinct change between the past and current policies can be discerned. With previous policies Pakistan had been a factor as regards Kashmir. Initiatives were launched wherein it was imperative to involve Pakistan through dialogue irrespective of the fact that the initiative may not have eventually succeeded at all. The true essence of bilateralism, if not exploited, was explored in the past initiatives. But there is a perceptible fork on the road to Kashmir which symbolically has come to represent India’s changing strategy on Kashmir. On the one hand direct talks between separatist outfits between separatist outfits in Srinagar and New Delhi could prove to be a more successful approach as the issue of Kashmir is now going to be discussed with people from Kashmir. The latest impetus to the peace moves can be placed within this category.

The second component, in this figurative fork in the road, is that of ties between India and Pakistan. On the face of it a new impetus is being provided to peace in the region through normalization talks and peace proposals etc. But this is also being brought about by literally discussing, with Pakistan, everything under the sun except Kashmir. The twelve points, introduced by the Prime Minister, represent the latest proposals within this second component. The points themselves can be divided into economic, strategic and diplomatic factors which if accepted can be potentially advantageous for India. Thus while the ostensible reason is to promote people to people contact, so as to restore normalcy, the undertones of the proposed points cannot be missed. For instance economically India will have a lot going for it if the air links and over flights are reestablished. Similarly strategically and diplomatically also India would be better placed if a degree of accountability can be established with the Pakistani forces across the border especially through coast guard contacts.

The last aspect at this junction involves fairly long term approaches but options which are inherently achievable. India’s border talks with China can be placed within this reasoning and could imply in the long term, an attempt at resolving the issue of the 5000 sq km Aksai Chin territory that Pakistan ceded to China in March 1963. Thus the overall emphasis bluntly put is to continue with bilateral talks, regarding Kashmir, with actors other than Pakistan while simultaneously keeping Pakistan engaged on all matters except Kashmir. That the Pakistanis are not happy with the offer made also comes across through the official statement from the foreign office who expressed disappointment at India’s desire to discuss everything but the core issue of Kashmir.

The decision to have Deputy Prime Minister Shri Lal Krishna Advani directly interfacing with the Hurriyat Conference leaders is a decision that is loaded with implications. While it is highly unlikely that the Deputy Prime Minister is going to be involved in the absolutes of the discussions to be held, his presence will nonetheless remain symbolic at the least. For one it will be symbolic of New Delhi’s desire to continue engaging with all players in Kashmir while simultaneously also encouraging the separatists to come to the negotiating table by offering them the possibility of engaging with the Government at the highest possible level. Secondly Advani’s appointment is also important because greater maneuverability in decision making can be expected from him, something which the State’s previous interlocutors had not been able to achieve. Also were it to be so that Advani was not to succeed in his talks with the Hurriyat leaders, a higher court of appeal in Prime Minister Vajpayee still remained open as a foreseeable option. Lastly ideologically speaking any hard line approach, that the Hurriyat may come to adopt, can only be successfully cornered by L K Advani.

On the Hurriyat front the talks can be seen as an acknowledgement of their long stated demands of talks at the highest level but probably not of their desire to be acknowledged as the head of a de-facto nation. That the All Party Hurriyat Conference has recently broken into two factions headed by hardliner Geelani on the one hand and the moderate Maulvi Ansari on the other hand is also an important factor for the Government. The offer for talks can be seen as a recognition of the Ansari led Hurriyat faction which the Center has come to acknowledge as the Hurriyat that represents the ‘voice’ of the Kashmiri people, in contrast to the Geelani faction, which has been recognised for pretty much the same purpose by Pakistan. The offer has been made to the Hurriyat council per se but in what form will the Hurriyat council come to be represented only the events of the coming few days will show. If the Geelani faction does come on board and the talks fail the blame would not fall on the Government for in all respects they have attempted to engage the outfit. If the Geelani faction does not come on board then also the Government emerges on top as the offer had been made to the body of Hurriyat as such; Hurriyat without any specifications. Also they would have managed to disengage Geelani from all future talks effortlessly.

On the State government front the Center has clearly established the dominant power role that it plays vis-à-vis the State on Kashmir. Politically also this is an important issue as the BJP led Center has overshadowed the Congress-PDP led State government through its peace initiatives and contrary to their healing touch policy.

Lastly this peace proposal will reinforce not only within the state of Jammu and Kashmir but also internationally India’s stated position of wanting to resolve the Kashmir issue, as it were, through engagement and dialogue.

Interpretations of attack on Sayyed’s residence

The residence of the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayyed was attacked in the early hours of October 17 by militants. As audacious as the attack may seem it is the message that the attack sends out that is of greater concern and this can be looked upon from different angles.

The attack showcases the international and domestic compulsions of Pakistan who is desperately trying to stir up the Kashmir issue at every given opportunity. It becomes symbolic when seen against the backdrop of the developments at the OIC meeting being held at Putrajaya, Malaysia. President Musharraf was able to have a "Declaration on Jammu and Kashmir" passed at the meeting of the OIC which called on India to ostensibly resume dialogue and resolve differences. The tone that President Musharraf adopted to achieve this was decidedly less aggressive and more defensive. He called on India to reconsider its rejectionist and belligerent posture while expressing concern over the continued violation of human rights in the state and the intensification of the repression of the people in the state; the attack on the Chief Minister’s residence can now be an example that Pakistan can use for reiterating its contention. This attack is also different as the responsibilities for it has been made by relatively unknown groups who go by the name of Al-Nasireen and Farzandan-e-Millat. It would come as no surprise if it were to be revealed that this group was formed entirely of disgruntled and frustrated native youth from the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This would further lay content to the claims made by Pakistan of the seething dissatisfaction that the people of the state feel towards official Government of India policies.

Nonetheless the domestic compulsions of Pakistan also become apparent with this attack. The internal happenings of Kashmir have left the policy makers in Pakistan wanting. For instance the All Party Hurriyat Conference has been broken into two factions with hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani not being able to garner the kind of support he had in the past and Maulvi Abbas Ansari, the leader of the official faction, being decidedly moderate and open to dialogue with New Delhi than any previous APHC chief. This development is being questioned by hardliners in Pakistan as a weakening of its support to separatist groups in the state and also as a result of the extensive compromises that Pakistan has made as a result of the US led war on terrorism. The attack can thus be seen as a desperate attempt to keep the Kashmir issue continuously highlighted.

The attack on the Chief Minister’s residence can be alternatively interpreted as a reiterated rejection by the militants of the Mufti’s healing touch policy. It seems ironic though as the policy not only calls for the release of militants in the state prisons but also for a reduction in the severity of counter infiltration operations along the state border.

The attack also coincides with the visit of a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Association is in the State to pay homage to those who lost their lives in the attack on the State legislative assembly. The attack and the target the militants chose would fervently express to an outsider, like nothing else, just how contentious the issue still is.

Thus it is important to trace the symbolism and nature of the attack while also realizing that this would probably the first of many attacks that can be expected in the coming months.