A number of events have taken place since I last updated the blog not least of which include - the trouncing of the Congress in 2 of the 3 states in which elections were held, Quattrocchi's arrest by Argentinean police and the failure of New Delhi in disclosing the same, bombing of the Samjhauta express by Muslims/Hindus/religious/communal/secular/Indians/Pakistanis, growing instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan with bombings taking place with increasing frequency, sustained confusion in the state of Dhaka's politics so on and so forth. These are events with a distinct S Asia focus. I am not even considering the escalating violence in Iraq and Syria, interesting verbal spats between Obama and Clinton, Iran's steadfast refusal to halt uranium enrichment, renewed violence between the Israeli and Palestinians over the construction of a rampart near the Al Aqsa mosque - I mean really - the list can get pretty lengthy!
A few thoughts however on the aforementioned events as time and days passed me by
- While I am personally gleeful at BJP victories in the states of Punjab and Uttaranchal, I do highly doubt if these would have an impact on the electoral fortunes of the NDA at a national level. There are a few reasons for this - the core party structure is still unsteady in its Hindutva ways having shunted out Modi and other RSS stalwarts who posed a threat to the power of party President Rajnath Singh; the party is still grappling to replace the power centres of the Vajpayee-Advani combine; the top down imposition by the RSS that 'the party is bigger than the person' is not so ironically, fuelling ego clashes and power struggles within the party are just some of the institutional issues that the BJP is facing. Fortunately for the BJP and unfortunately for the state of Indian politics the Congress is faring no better when it comes to putting its house in order.
- I am not quite sure how New Delhi and indeed Sanjaya Baru - the PMO's press advisor can utilise the government's propaganda machinery to spin news about the Gandhi family's close associate and key accused in the Bofors case, Quattrocchi’s arrest almost a month by Argentinean police at the Iguazu airport in response to an Interpol Red Corner notice issued against him in 1997. I don't think that explanations regarding the delayed disclosure of this vital news can be sought in any of the humbug reasons the Government has so far put forth -verification of the man arrested, difficulties in translating the Spanish text (Quoi??!!!) etc etc. So if spin is not the answer in this situation, the Govt has sought the next best thing - to keep the hum about Quattrocchi to a bare minimum in national dailies. Strange as it may be, the losses faced by the Congress in state elections allowed for public and indeed media attention to shift from Quattrocchi to Punjab/Uttaranchal; from the state of the Government to the state of the party. Even the BJP dropped the issue and reverted to crowing about its victories. Currently the annual Budget occupies the remarkably short span of collective political memory in India. A good overview of the Q saga can however be found here.
- The bomb blasts on the Samjhauta express were indeed disconcerting but what probably worried more were news reports on the 'terrorists' responsible for it. The usual suspects were spelt out with no conclusive evidence to back claims by either Pakistan or India; the doves of the Kashmir peace process were convinced that this was an effort to sabotage the peace process while the hawks were convinced that the bombings were another proof of Pakistan's complicity in sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. Both camps thus reached their near sighted conclusions and favour of and against peace talks. Unfortunately it did not end here. Ridiculous news reports claiming that since Muslims were targeted meant that some right wing Hindu outfit was involved whilst others were convinced that the blasts were part of Pakistan's dirty game plan to foil communal harmony in secular India. The fact that no one has as yet claimed responsibility does not matter. Conspiracy theories are aplenty. My question is - why does the religion of the victims matter when a terrorist act is carried out? Aren't victims faceless? Isn't the grief of a Muslim equal to that of a Hindu? Terrorism is terrorism - period. Why typify it on the basis of a man made construct - religion?!
- I have given up tracking the bomb blasts, suicide attacks, rocket attacks, IEDs and other sundry devices that have recently been deployed against the military and state installations in an increasingly volatile Pakistan. Unfortunately however, the victims are mostly innocent civilians. With daily reports referring to a growing presence of Taliban and that of a regrouped Al Qaeda in the lawless FATA and North western province of Pakistan, one wonders if this is indeed another case of a self fulfilling prophecy for Musharraf which would have allowed him to re-establish the Taliban in Afghanistan. Fortunately the US has at least started seeing the fallacy of believing everything that the General promises. It remains to be seen of course what Musharraf can do in the face of this increasing pressure or the alternatives that the US can employ in such a situation.
- Politics in Dhaka of late has begun to remind me of those extreme acrobatics that can only be witnessed in the Cirque du Soleil and therefore it has sparked renewed interest! The BNP and AL - two parties consistently at loggerheads with each other, have suddenly joined hands to demand early elections from the caretaker Govt. Of course the rationale for this sudden desire to impart good governance can be sought in the anti corruption drive that was recently launched by the caretaker government and the announcement of the formation of a political party by Nobel Peace prize winner Mohammed Yunus. Realising that their political space was being targeted - both by the Government and by the new entrant - the two parties decided to bury their differences and survive together to fight another day. Their ploy may however not be working as latest reports suggest that the caretaker government of Dr Fakruddin Ahmed has decided to postpone elections indefinitely! Oh well - I give the BNP and AL full marks for trying at least. Interestingly, Dr Yunus had recently stated that were elections to be held soon he would not be able to form an effective party structure or for that matter affect a change in the political stage of Bangladesh! Food for thought?!
My whirlwind recollection of recent political events with a S Asia/India focus concludes here. More regular posts to follow soon.
PS: Oh and Kim Jong Il, the venerable leader of North Korea, celebrated his 65th birthday amidst much fanfare in February. Joy!
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
Friday, February 9, 2007
Nobel Military
Political turmoil of the last few months in Bangladesh appears to have now subsided under the oddest of circumstances. With tacit support of the Army, the caretaker government under chief advisor Fakruddin Ahmed has launched a massive drive against corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and terrorist masterminds in the country. In all more than 400 senior, mid level and grass root politicians, from both the BNP and the AL are being targeted with the majority already having been apprehended by joint forces. This kind of a top down effort at exorcising corrupt politicians and leaders of terrorist groups who receive and provide political patronage, from the system is indeed to be lauded by one and all, but it also raises several uncomfortable questions that remain to be answered.
For one, with the arrests of top BNP and especially AL leaders, New Delhi might definitely find the political base of its main ally in Dhaka - the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League party, shrunk. Two, while the Army chief, Lt Gen Moeen U Ahmed has gone on record and said that
"The army has no intention to take over. We are not even running the government. But we like to see this government successful as we want to put the country on the right track through concerted efforts of all"
it does not dispel doubts whether the Army and the caretaker government together would have ever felt empowered enough to carry out such a cleansing operation in Dhaka's murky politics. Thus rumours of a 'foreign power' being involved in the current developments cannot be dismissed with a foregone conclusion. The third and most relevant development till date has been the foray of Nobel Peace prize winner, Dr Mohammed Yunus into Bangladeshi politics. Announcing his decision to launch a political party, were he to be accepted by the Bangladeshi electorate is nothing more than a precursor to a more formal announcement. It begs to be questioned whether the good doctor is being supported by the same foreign power whose influence is being suspected in the current political drama, and, how effectively would Dr Yunus' party exploit the space being created on Bangladesh's political stage. Lastly and most importantly, with these developments taking place in Bangladesh, a change in New Delhi's policy towards Dhaka is hopefully anticipated to be one that takes into account the changed ground realities of the neighbouring country.
Previous posts on Bangladesh's recent political developments can be read here and here.
For one, with the arrests of top BNP and especially AL leaders, New Delhi might definitely find the political base of its main ally in Dhaka - the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League party, shrunk. Two, while the Army chief, Lt Gen Moeen U Ahmed has gone on record and said that
"The army has no intention to take over. We are not even running the government. But we like to see this government successful as we want to put the country on the right track through concerted efforts of all"
it does not dispel doubts whether the Army and the caretaker government together would have ever felt empowered enough to carry out such a cleansing operation in Dhaka's murky politics. Thus rumours of a 'foreign power' being involved in the current developments cannot be dismissed with a foregone conclusion. The third and most relevant development till date has been the foray of Nobel Peace prize winner, Dr Mohammed Yunus into Bangladeshi politics. Announcing his decision to launch a political party, were he to be accepted by the Bangladeshi electorate is nothing more than a precursor to a more formal announcement. It begs to be questioned whether the good doctor is being supported by the same foreign power whose influence is being suspected in the current political drama, and, how effectively would Dr Yunus' party exploit the space being created on Bangladesh's political stage. Lastly and most importantly, with these developments taking place in Bangladesh, a change in New Delhi's policy towards Dhaka is hopefully anticipated to be one that takes into account the changed ground realities of the neighbouring country.
Previous posts on Bangladesh's recent political developments can be read here and here.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Down the opium path
Reports from Pakistan and Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban has run over the town of Musa Qala in the southern province of Helmand in Afghanistan. Besides highlighting the strength of a resurgent Taliban this development may just serve as an indicator of another chapter in the political fortunes of an already volatile nation besides posing some serious questions for India's presence and strategic relevance in the country.
Independent, Pashtun dominated and fierce tribal loyalty are not just norms but lessons of Afghanistan's volatile polity. Even today, despite having an elected government led by Hamid Karzai, it is a known fact that the writ of the government is not recognised beyond Kabul. Faced with a resurgent Taliban and increasing pressure from Nato forces and US administration, the Karzai government had recently begun to endorse alternative means that would accomodate rival centres of power whilst ensuring that the rule of law and order prevails in different parts of the country.
One such experiment was conducted in the Musa Qala district of Helmand province in Southern Afghanistan. Under constant attack by regrouped Taliban forces, the British struck a deal, brokered by the village and tribal elders and endorsed by then provincial Governor - Mohammed Daud, to bring about peace in the district. This deal was meant to meet the goals of each of the concerned parties: peace for the people of Musa Qala, withdrawal from an unnecessary conflict for the British, tacit acknowledgment of Taliban prominence in the region and, were peace to prevail in the region, a prototype that could be applied for all of Afghanistan. Most importantly the deal also underscored how the Taliban, Pashtun pride, ethnic divisions and tribal loyalty, all constituents in the Afghan polity, be incorporated without either of them having to appear as if they compromised. Under the clauses of the deal it was deemed that with the withdrawal of the British forces, law and order was to be maintained by a police force formed by the district itself and supervised by the tribal elders.
This deal unfortunately did not meet the approval of the Americans who neither supported the truce or the terms it was reached within. They vowed to disregard the terms of the deal and re-launch operations in the district but one of the first things they did was to get Governor Daud replaced as it was at his insistence that the deal was brokered. Recent reports that Musa Qala has been run over by the Taliban comes barely 3 months after the deal and seems to confirm the worst fears of the Americans for Afghanistan. It is a poppy growing region, a Taliban stronghold and dominated by Ghilzai Pashtuns who resent the favor being shown by Karzai to higher ranked Pashtuns such as himself (Durranis). It is pertinent to note here that the Ghilzai Pashtuns are being actively recruited by the Taliban to fill their ranks.
This development can lead to a single conclusion which would need to be urgently addressed by New Delhi. If Musa Qala is a precursor of the events to come in Afghanistan, what policy options would India have in the region? The intricacies of the country and its people would need to be understood fully before any policy is adopted and implemented by New Delhi. In the meantime the developments suit the strategic aims of Pakistan whilst ensuring that the return of the 'moderate' Taliban is all but an eventual certainty.
Independent, Pashtun dominated and fierce tribal loyalty are not just norms but lessons of Afghanistan's volatile polity. Even today, despite having an elected government led by Hamid Karzai, it is a known fact that the writ of the government is not recognised beyond Kabul. Faced with a resurgent Taliban and increasing pressure from Nato forces and US administration, the Karzai government had recently begun to endorse alternative means that would accomodate rival centres of power whilst ensuring that the rule of law and order prevails in different parts of the country.
One such experiment was conducted in the Musa Qala district of Helmand province in Southern Afghanistan. Under constant attack by regrouped Taliban forces, the British struck a deal, brokered by the village and tribal elders and endorsed by then provincial Governor - Mohammed Daud, to bring about peace in the district. This deal was meant to meet the goals of each of the concerned parties: peace for the people of Musa Qala, withdrawal from an unnecessary conflict for the British, tacit acknowledgment of Taliban prominence in the region and, were peace to prevail in the region, a prototype that could be applied for all of Afghanistan. Most importantly the deal also underscored how the Taliban, Pashtun pride, ethnic divisions and tribal loyalty, all constituents in the Afghan polity, be incorporated without either of them having to appear as if they compromised. Under the clauses of the deal it was deemed that with the withdrawal of the British forces, law and order was to be maintained by a police force formed by the district itself and supervised by the tribal elders.
This deal unfortunately did not meet the approval of the Americans who neither supported the truce or the terms it was reached within. They vowed to disregard the terms of the deal and re-launch operations in the district but one of the first things they did was to get Governor Daud replaced as it was at his insistence that the deal was brokered. Recent reports that Musa Qala has been run over by the Taliban comes barely 3 months after the deal and seems to confirm the worst fears of the Americans for Afghanistan. It is a poppy growing region, a Taliban stronghold and dominated by Ghilzai Pashtuns who resent the favor being shown by Karzai to higher ranked Pashtuns such as himself (Durranis). It is pertinent to note here that the Ghilzai Pashtuns are being actively recruited by the Taliban to fill their ranks.
This development can lead to a single conclusion which would need to be urgently addressed by New Delhi. If Musa Qala is a precursor of the events to come in Afghanistan, what policy options would India have in the region? The intricacies of the country and its people would need to be understood fully before any policy is adopted and implemented by New Delhi. In the meantime the developments suit the strategic aims of Pakistan whilst ensuring that the return of the 'moderate' Taliban is all but an eventual certainty.
Monday, January 22, 2007
A Presidential Mission
Senator Hillary Clinton (D - NY) recently announced what many have suspected and expected for a while - her bid to return to the White House in 2009, albeit as President elect of the United States of America and not as the First Lady. While her announcement may not have been surprising, it does throw open a set of delicious questions for the forthcoming US Presidential elections.
The most relevant question of course focuses on Senator Clinton's running mate, should she win the party's nomination that is. Could it be the very popular Senator Obama (D - Ill) or the charming John Edwards, both of whom are incidentally expected to be front runners for the nomination themselves. In the event that its a Clinton-Obama ticket, the question that would then seek to be addressed is whether America was liberal enough to elect its first female President and African American Vice President. I have my reservations on this count but polls in the coming months should give a clearer indication of this assessment.
Interestingly, even though Senator Clinton has only announced her decision to set up an exploratory committee to gauge her viability as the party's candidate, the manner of her announcement (made online and not at a press briefing as is traditionally done) and her words 'I'm in and I'm in to win' pretty much underline her intention. Her words can also be interpreted as an open challenge to Senator Barack Obama, who many see as her main competition for the party nomination. Similarly the urgency of her announcement can be attributed to the need to corner prominent fundraisers and contributors before they endorse other candidates. (Senator Obama had announced the setting up of a similar exploratory committee only last week and had immediately received the endorsement of billionaire George Soros)
Needless to say, Elections 2008 and the battle for the White House promises to be a political rollercoaster and one which New Delhi should closely follow given the possibilities of another Clinton administration.
The most relevant question of course focuses on Senator Clinton's running mate, should she win the party's nomination that is. Could it be the very popular Senator Obama (D - Ill) or the charming John Edwards, both of whom are incidentally expected to be front runners for the nomination themselves. In the event that its a Clinton-Obama ticket, the question that would then seek to be addressed is whether America was liberal enough to elect its first female President and African American Vice President. I have my reservations on this count but polls in the coming months should give a clearer indication of this assessment.
Interestingly, even though Senator Clinton has only announced her decision to set up an exploratory committee to gauge her viability as the party's candidate, the manner of her announcement (made online and not at a press briefing as is traditionally done) and her words 'I'm in and I'm in to win' pretty much underline her intention. Her words can also be interpreted as an open challenge to Senator Barack Obama, who many see as her main competition for the party nomination. Similarly the urgency of her announcement can be attributed to the need to corner prominent fundraisers and contributors before they endorse other candidates. (Senator Obama had announced the setting up of a similar exploratory committee only last week and had immediately received the endorsement of billionaire George Soros)
Needless to say, Elections 2008 and the battle for the White House promises to be a political rollercoaster and one which New Delhi should closely follow given the possibilities of another Clinton administration.
More on Bangladesh
A recent newspaper report from Bangladesh alleges that the bomb attack on Awami League leader, Sheikh Hasina was carried out by the ULFA who had in turn received assistance from the Bangladeshi intelligence agency, the National Security Intelligence (NSI). If this is indeed proven true then it would confirm the link between ULFA and Dhaka. A discerning piece by former Chief of IB, M K Dhar reiterates the same. The two articles can be read from the following links:
http://thedailystar.net/2007/01/22/d7012201044.htm
and
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jan/19guest.htm
With this understanding in hand and the rationale for the attacks on Bihari migrants as opposed to illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam, one has to wonder when New Delhi would initiate any action against an outfit that is clearly targetting Indian interests.
http://thedailystar.net/2007/01/22/d7012201044.htm
and
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jan/19guest.htm
With this understanding in hand and the rationale for the attacks on Bihari migrants as opposed to illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam, one has to wonder when New Delhi would initiate any action against an outfit that is clearly targetting Indian interests.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Elections in Bangladesh
For all the political turmoil being witnessed currently in Bangladesh, New Delhi has surprisingly been a quiet observer of the events unfolding in the tiny nation state. Unlike the time when another of India's neighbour's, Nepal, was witnessing political upheaval - a period accompanied by hectic parleys, nothing of the sort is being witnessed in the case of Bangladesh. This is indeed an ironic situation since political uncertainty seems to be rife in Bangladesh.
Since the caretaker Govt has come to power in Dhaka late last year, election boycott has been threatened by the Awami League Grand Coalition or the Maha Jote on various grounds including disagreement over the choice of the chief advisor to the caretaker Govt, the selection of the advisors, the deployment of the armed forces for electoral purposes and over the correction of the voter list. Eventually the AL led 19 party alliance refused to contest elections when the nomination papers of its constituent partner, Ershad of the JAPA party, were cancelled from 5 different constituencies. With the main opposition alliance withdrawing from the electoral process, the country seemed set to hold one party elections - a situation avoided only due to the pressure brought on by US, UK, the EU and the United Nations.The deafening silence from New Delhi seems odd to this analyst as events in Bangladesh obviously affect Indian domestic, regional and anti-terrorism policies. National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan's recent statement attesting to the presence of ULFA camps in Bangladesh along with various other separatist outfits further confounds the lack of a policy oriented response from New Delhi.
Could it be that New Delhi wants to avoid reacting to events in Dhaka, beyond the cursory and cautious statements, to prevent accusations of interference ahead of the SAARC summit? It does seem odd that India would stand on ceremony and not protect its interests in Bangladesh, it is also the only plausible reasoning that can be derived from the situation.
Lack of responses to situations in India's immediate neighbourhood could signal an ominous orientation,or lack thereof, to New Delhi's policies.
Since the caretaker Govt has come to power in Dhaka late last year, election boycott has been threatened by the Awami League Grand Coalition or the Maha Jote on various grounds including disagreement over the choice of the chief advisor to the caretaker Govt, the selection of the advisors, the deployment of the armed forces for electoral purposes and over the correction of the voter list. Eventually the AL led 19 party alliance refused to contest elections when the nomination papers of its constituent partner, Ershad of the JAPA party, were cancelled from 5 different constituencies. With the main opposition alliance withdrawing from the electoral process, the country seemed set to hold one party elections - a situation avoided only due to the pressure brought on by US, UK, the EU and the United Nations.The deafening silence from New Delhi seems odd to this analyst as events in Bangladesh obviously affect Indian domestic, regional and anti-terrorism policies. National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan's recent statement attesting to the presence of ULFA camps in Bangladesh along with various other separatist outfits further confounds the lack of a policy oriented response from New Delhi.
Could it be that New Delhi wants to avoid reacting to events in Dhaka, beyond the cursory and cautious statements, to prevent accusations of interference ahead of the SAARC summit? It does seem odd that India would stand on ceremony and not protect its interests in Bangladesh, it is also the only plausible reasoning that can be derived from the situation.
Lack of responses to situations in India's immediate neighbourhood could signal an ominous orientation,or lack thereof, to New Delhi's policies.
Monday, November 20, 2006
Pakistan proposes and India disposes
Ever since the ceasefire almost two years ago along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, speculation has been rife on a) whether this ceasefire would finally result in the brokering of a lasting peace between the two neighbours; b) what would be the nature of a final solution and c) how long would it take for this solution to materialize? Besides this, there has always been the constant worry over India’s threshold for cross border terrorism and whether or not it would succeed in derailing this peace process.
India’s focus since the ceasefire has been to keep Pakistan engaged on two fronts – one, by ensuring continued dialogue on a number of fronts in the form of confidence building measures and two, engaging with Islamabad on Kashmir specific issues. The results for both have been significant. The former has helped bridge the trust discrepancy between the two neighbours and the latter has aided in highlighting the two neighbours ability to work on contentious bilateral issues. The difference between India and Pakistan however has been over the pace with which the two countries approach discussions. For India, the developments should be gradual, a point indicative in its stand for first building trust through CBM’s, whereas for Pakistan an earlier resolution to this issue seems acceptable.
The disclosure that Pakistani Prime Minister had made a proposal for self-governance along the sidelines of the SAARC summit to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had only increased speculation about the aforementioned three questions. It is another matter of course that the Indian side dismissed the proposal, albeit on grounds of official modalities. But before one considers the reasons behind New Delhi’s rejection of the proposal, the ‘Musharraf proposal’ as it is being called must be studied.
This is not the first time that President Musharraf has made statements on what would constitute a viable solution for Kashmir. In fact approximately a year back he had made proposals that called for the identification of seven regions from the erstwhile state – two in Pakistan and five in India – which would then be demilitarized and their status changed. This proposal was summarily rejected by India because it would have meant the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines. A year on, the proposal from Pakistan does not seem all that much different. The Musharraf proposal in essence calls for the division of the state into five geographical entities, demilitarizing them and according them maximum self-governance. Thus besides the reduction in the number of regions that needed to be demilitarized, the new addition in this proposal is the concept of self-governance. In fact the roots for this new proposal can be found in the US based Kashmir Study Group’s report of February 2005 on solutions for Kashmir. The report of 2005 is itself a departure from its report released in 2000 wherein it had called for the division of the state into 7 regions – a concept now popularized through President Musharraf’s suggestion.
On the face of things, it appears that the new proposal cannot be dismissed so easily since the projected self-governance probably comes closest to New Delhi’s stated desire of extending ‘maximum self-autonomy’ to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But there remain numerous reasons for India to reject this proposal from Pakistan.
For one, even if the proposal calls for the establishment of five and not seven entities, the division in Jammu and Kashmir would still take on communal overtones. In the previous proposal, the division of the regions was along religious lines was overt. If considered, the new proposal still manages the division of the state into a Muslim Kashmir, a Hindu Jammu and a Buddhist Ladakh. This arrangement would never be acceptable to New Delhi in any eventuality. Secondly, the increased infiltration from across the border, in the wake of the devastating earthquake and especially in the face of India’s aid to Pakistan, has not helped bridge the trust factor. To acknowledge a proposed solution in the face of increased infiltration would negate India’s stand on cross border terrorism and portray New Delhi as weak. Thirdly, the call for demilitarization of the region, as the proposal suggests can never materialize if cross border terrorism continues. So the actions from across the border contradict the proposal themselves. Fourthly, India’s stand on soft borders would at least ensure its continued sovereignty over the state – a concept not possible under the proposal. Lastly, the proposal still does not take into account the wishes of the people from Jammu and Ladakh – two of the three regions from India – who have consistently called for greater integration with New Delhi.
Thus from all conceivable angles, a proposal in this form, could never be accepted by India. However, New Delhi will soon need to devise its own framework for a solution rather than merely rejecting a formal submission of one from Islamabad especially since reports from Pakistan suggest that President Musharraf is in no hurry to yield on this ‘solution’ any time soon.
India’s focus since the ceasefire has been to keep Pakistan engaged on two fronts – one, by ensuring continued dialogue on a number of fronts in the form of confidence building measures and two, engaging with Islamabad on Kashmir specific issues. The results for both have been significant. The former has helped bridge the trust discrepancy between the two neighbours and the latter has aided in highlighting the two neighbours ability to work on contentious bilateral issues. The difference between India and Pakistan however has been over the pace with which the two countries approach discussions. For India, the developments should be gradual, a point indicative in its stand for first building trust through CBM’s, whereas for Pakistan an earlier resolution to this issue seems acceptable.
The disclosure that Pakistani Prime Minister had made a proposal for self-governance along the sidelines of the SAARC summit to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had only increased speculation about the aforementioned three questions. It is another matter of course that the Indian side dismissed the proposal, albeit on grounds of official modalities. But before one considers the reasons behind New Delhi’s rejection of the proposal, the ‘Musharraf proposal’ as it is being called must be studied.
This is not the first time that President Musharraf has made statements on what would constitute a viable solution for Kashmir. In fact approximately a year back he had made proposals that called for the identification of seven regions from the erstwhile state – two in Pakistan and five in India – which would then be demilitarized and their status changed. This proposal was summarily rejected by India because it would have meant the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines. A year on, the proposal from Pakistan does not seem all that much different. The Musharraf proposal in essence calls for the division of the state into five geographical entities, demilitarizing them and according them maximum self-governance. Thus besides the reduction in the number of regions that needed to be demilitarized, the new addition in this proposal is the concept of self-governance. In fact the roots for this new proposal can be found in the US based Kashmir Study Group’s report of February 2005 on solutions for Kashmir. The report of 2005 is itself a departure from its report released in 2000 wherein it had called for the division of the state into 7 regions – a concept now popularized through President Musharraf’s suggestion.
On the face of things, it appears that the new proposal cannot be dismissed so easily since the projected self-governance probably comes closest to New Delhi’s stated desire of extending ‘maximum self-autonomy’ to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But there remain numerous reasons for India to reject this proposal from Pakistan.
For one, even if the proposal calls for the establishment of five and not seven entities, the division in Jammu and Kashmir would still take on communal overtones. In the previous proposal, the division of the regions was along religious lines was overt. If considered, the new proposal still manages the division of the state into a Muslim Kashmir, a Hindu Jammu and a Buddhist Ladakh. This arrangement would never be acceptable to New Delhi in any eventuality. Secondly, the increased infiltration from across the border, in the wake of the devastating earthquake and especially in the face of India’s aid to Pakistan, has not helped bridge the trust factor. To acknowledge a proposed solution in the face of increased infiltration would negate India’s stand on cross border terrorism and portray New Delhi as weak. Thirdly, the call for demilitarization of the region, as the proposal suggests can never materialize if cross border terrorism continues. So the actions from across the border contradict the proposal themselves. Fourthly, India’s stand on soft borders would at least ensure its continued sovereignty over the state – a concept not possible under the proposal. Lastly, the proposal still does not take into account the wishes of the people from Jammu and Ladakh – two of the three regions from India – who have consistently called for greater integration with New Delhi.
Thus from all conceivable angles, a proposal in this form, could never be accepted by India. However, New Delhi will soon need to devise its own framework for a solution rather than merely rejecting a formal submission of one from Islamabad especially since reports from Pakistan suggest that President Musharraf is in no hurry to yield on this ‘solution’ any time soon.
Implications of Violence in Balochistan
The largest of Pakistan’s four provinces, Balochistan is also the least developed and the least populated. Because of its sparse population it is ignored in federal fund allocation – accorded as it is on the basis of the census figures of a province. Further, despite being rich in mineral resources and natural gas, the province has been unable to ensure that benefits of this advantage accrue in its favour. For instance, even though gas from Sui district of Balochistan accounts for 38 percent of Pakistan’s supply, only 6 percent of the province’s population has access to it. Largely a tribal society, where the Bugti, Murri and Mengal tribes have been predominant, the province has of late also been witness to a demographic shift. A significant number of Pashtuns have travelled across the Afghan border in the wake of US intervention, resulting in the undermining of the one uniting factor – the socio-cultural identity that the tribals collectively imposed - in the province. This is the reality as it exists in Balochistan province of Pakistan today and it is primarily because of these socio-political and economic reasons that an uprising is being witnessed in the province.
The region’s present is not far removed from its past either. Recalcitrant and unwilling participants in the eventual composition of Pakistan, the people of the province have underlined their independent streak vis-à-vis the state on at least three different occasions in the country’s 58-year-old history. But the events of last year underline intensity and coordination that has so far not been witnessed in any of the previous confrontations of the Baloch nationalists against the state. For the first time the three different tribes have come together under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) banner to contest the writ of Islamabad in the province. Secondly, the leaders of the students’ agitation, witnessed in the 70’s, are leading the current unrest. Thirdly, the unrest is far more organised and well equipped than it has ever been in the past with the tactical understanding of the rebels becoming apparent through attacks on gas pipelines, army installations and other such areas of strategic relevance.
Oddly this unrest comes in the midst of major development projects that are in the pipeline in the province. The federal government had only recently sanctioned Rs. 140 billion for the development of roads and water reservoirs in the region. In addition the development of the Gwadar port is expected to bring in a lot of revenue for the region. However, it is these very development projects that have fuelled suspicion amongst tribal leaders over the designs of the federal government in the resource rich region. For one, the tribal leaders feel that the advantages of these projects would not benefit the region itself. Rather, they feel that the benefits would be reaped by Islamabad and to support their contention they point to several instances in the past. Second, tribal leaders are worried that the development of road networks linking the province with other parts of Pakistan will accord Islamabad greater presence in the region. The development of three more army installations in strategic areas reaffirms their suspicions. Third, there is a growing fear that the Balochis are being reduced to a minority in their own region, a trend that will grow with the development of the port and road networks. To this end tribal leaders point to the recent election results in the province where the dominant electorate of the Pashtuns voted the ultra right Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal into power. Therefore, there is a general awareness that the traditional political base is being slowly eroded.
Thus, fuelled by these suspicions, exemplified by events in the past, the tribal leaders are exploiting a developing ‘fear psychosis’ within the community in order to wage a growing conflict with the state of Pakistan. The goals that they hope to achieve with this fight are greater control over resources and more say in the development projects undertaken in the region. Taken together, the recent events in Balochistan do lead one to consider the growing strategic implications of violence, for the province, and for the state of Pakistan. Is this violence expected to spiral out of control leading to the break up of the state? And more importantly, could it be that this conflict be supported by India?
The answer to both these questions is a resounding no! Even if the violence does fester, eventually Islamabad and the tribal leaders are likely to arrive at a consensus that would benefit all. And even though the rebels are well armed and better organised it does not appear that they have India’s tacit support especially since bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been on the upswing. The foremost fall out of this conflict; besides human rights violations and delay of development projects in the province, would be the intensification of nationalist sentiments amongst the Balochis – something that will affect Pakistan in the long run.
The region’s present is not far removed from its past either. Recalcitrant and unwilling participants in the eventual composition of Pakistan, the people of the province have underlined their independent streak vis-à-vis the state on at least three different occasions in the country’s 58-year-old history. But the events of last year underline intensity and coordination that has so far not been witnessed in any of the previous confrontations of the Baloch nationalists against the state. For the first time the three different tribes have come together under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) banner to contest the writ of Islamabad in the province. Secondly, the leaders of the students’ agitation, witnessed in the 70’s, are leading the current unrest. Thirdly, the unrest is far more organised and well equipped than it has ever been in the past with the tactical understanding of the rebels becoming apparent through attacks on gas pipelines, army installations and other such areas of strategic relevance.
Oddly this unrest comes in the midst of major development projects that are in the pipeline in the province. The federal government had only recently sanctioned Rs. 140 billion for the development of roads and water reservoirs in the region. In addition the development of the Gwadar port is expected to bring in a lot of revenue for the region. However, it is these very development projects that have fuelled suspicion amongst tribal leaders over the designs of the federal government in the resource rich region. For one, the tribal leaders feel that the advantages of these projects would not benefit the region itself. Rather, they feel that the benefits would be reaped by Islamabad and to support their contention they point to several instances in the past. Second, tribal leaders are worried that the development of road networks linking the province with other parts of Pakistan will accord Islamabad greater presence in the region. The development of three more army installations in strategic areas reaffirms their suspicions. Third, there is a growing fear that the Balochis are being reduced to a minority in their own region, a trend that will grow with the development of the port and road networks. To this end tribal leaders point to the recent election results in the province where the dominant electorate of the Pashtuns voted the ultra right Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal into power. Therefore, there is a general awareness that the traditional political base is being slowly eroded.
Thus, fuelled by these suspicions, exemplified by events in the past, the tribal leaders are exploiting a developing ‘fear psychosis’ within the community in order to wage a growing conflict with the state of Pakistan. The goals that they hope to achieve with this fight are greater control over resources and more say in the development projects undertaken in the region. Taken together, the recent events in Balochistan do lead one to consider the growing strategic implications of violence, for the province, and for the state of Pakistan. Is this violence expected to spiral out of control leading to the break up of the state? And more importantly, could it be that this conflict be supported by India?
The answer to both these questions is a resounding no! Even if the violence does fester, eventually Islamabad and the tribal leaders are likely to arrive at a consensus that would benefit all. And even though the rebels are well armed and better organised it does not appear that they have India’s tacit support especially since bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been on the upswing. The foremost fall out of this conflict; besides human rights violations and delay of development projects in the province, would be the intensification of nationalist sentiments amongst the Balochis – something that will affect Pakistan in the long run.
Talks with Pakistan: Feel good factor of a different kind?
In one of the most recent analytical pieces on this website it was very wisely quoted “Don't hear, listen. Listen to what is not being said” (sic) as regards the Indo – Pakistan peace talks and their decision to hold a composite dialogue. Thus ironically while most peaceniks, in Pakistan and India are hailing the recent thaw in relations it remains advisable to be cautiously optimistic for the time being. This opinion is not being proffered for the mere reason of being conservative as regards Indo – Pak initiatives towards peace in Kashmir. Rather this opinion is based upon media reports emerging from India and Pakistan which convey the compulsions and significance for both countries on this road to peace. When delineated they fall into three broad categories; the economics of peace, domestic compulsions and international pressures.
Up until September and the UN General Assembly any mention of bilateral talks were denied vehemently by both sides. Regularly stated arguments were resorted to at frequent intervals clearly belying any interest in the resolution of the Kashmir conundrum. However while all the parleys at the political level were discontinuing, at the economic level, the same were clearly intensifying. In September 2003 an India-Pakistan CEO’s Business Forum was launched by India’s Foreign Affairs minister Mr. Yashwant Sinha where he called for expanding bilateral trade between the two nations. Considering that unauthorized illegal trade between the two nations is estimated at $2 billion whereas legal trade is estimated to be a mere $200 – $250 million this proposal makes good economic sense. Pakistan follows a very restrictive trading regime versus India primarily as it links the issue of Kashmir with the normalization of any bilateral economic ties. Thus actual volumes of trade have always remained limited. Now however there appears to be a distinct change in the way issues are approached vis-à-vis Pakistan. It should be noted that this author had in a previous article mentioned the veritable fork in the road as far as bilateral relations with Pakistan is concerned. There is a willingness to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, a composite dialogue as it were, with Kashmir being only one of the issues for discussions. At the same time the political plane between New Delhi and Srinagar is being leveled to a certain extent with the decision to hold high level talks with separatist amalgamations. That Kashmir, the issue, has been relegated as a secondary cause in the bureaucratic lexicon of both India and Pakistan would be too early to declare. But one can definitely assert that it no longer remains the only issue for consideration for bettering bilateral ties. Thus would it be so difficult to imagine that the imperatives for peace with Pakistan, over Kashmir and any other outstanding issues may actually be determined via economic prospects and the accruable advantages of the same? That the economics of peace would play a major role in the times to come has also been ascertained by reports that suggest that trade and economic issues would be a priority for India and Pakistan in their composite dialogue rather than Kashmir. Then again the improved economic ties should not pose a problem in the long run. One can always cite the example of China and Taiwan. For all practical purposes and for all the razor edge tensions between the two nations, China and Taiwan still maintain healthy economic relations. In fact statistics reveal that bilateral trade for these two nations rose by 25% thereby exceeding US$50 billion this year. Thus despite increasing tensions trade volumes for Taiwan have been steadily increasing. The enormity of these statistics does not reflect the fact that up until a decade ago no formal economic relations existed between these two neighbours. The signing of the free trade agreement or SAFTA at Islamabad is an indication that both India and Pakistan are ready to trade with each other. Thus it would not be wrong to speculate that the current peace efforts were being dictated by the accruable economic advantages for India and Pakistan rather than at efforts to settle Kashmir. Were it so then it would truly mark a departure from previous efforts of this administration.
But the economic imperatives may not be the only factor leading up to the talks. For each of the leaders in India and Pakistan there are various factors at stake in initiating bilateral dialogue at this stage. For one there may be this inherently logical reasoning which calls into question the need for a dialogue at this particular hour. After two almost fatal attacks on his life why would President Musharraf agree to talks with India, an act which may further anger the very people being suspected of being the masterminds behind the attacks? It could be theorized that for President Musharraf the only way to defy the militants and simultaneously assert his authority maybe to change tack on India and thereby Kashmir. As radical as it does sound this may well be one of the reasons that have resulted in the coming together of Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf at Islamabad. Then again there may have been little maneuverability for President Musharraf especially when Mr. Vajpayee declared that this may be his last attempt at forging peace between the two warring neighbours. Alternatively, skepticism would be paramount as to the timing of the sudden change of heart. Facing increasing criticism on the charges that Pakistan has been proliferating nuclear technology to countries like Iran, Libya and North Korea; this may well be an opportune time to show a change of heart on an issue as contentious as Kashmir and thereby Pakistan and General Musharraf’s sincerity in resolving other outstanding issues.
Similarly in India talks on Kashmir could well serve the electoral and policy compulsions of the NDA government. Speculations are awash in the media about the now almost certain postponement of general elections, initially slated for September 2004. Thus the peace talks with Pakistan on the one hand and the Hurriyat on the other would be shining examples of a ‘feel good’ factor of a different kind. Both when taken together will serve as an invaluable electoral manifesto that can promote the secularity of the BJP led NDA government. Fringe voters may thus be influenced on the apparent perception that peace with Pakistan and within Kashmir was possible after reelection.
When one insulates all the implications on a probable peace dialogue with Pakistan the recent peace forays tend to be understood better. The last such compelling factor for the peace initiatives may well have come from the American pressure on both nations to resolve the Kashmir issue or at least appear that they were close to resolving the same. Though not out rightly American presence and involvement in Kashmir has steadily and gradually been increasing. Statements from Mirwaiz Umer Farooq and Secretary of State Colin Powell himself have asserted that the United States has played an important role in facilitating the discussions between India and Pakistan. But to understand the extent of their involvement one just has to glance through the itinerary of diplomats visiting Kashmir in the past six odd months. The US deputy chief of missions and its current Charge d’ Affairs Robert-O-Blake was the first foreign dignitary to meet with the Chairman of the moderate Hurriyat faction in Srinagar. Besides a number of American delegates, from the State Department and otherwise had met and held consultations, with relevant groups, on Kashmir, in Delhi and Srinagar.
So this is what we have…the current peace initiatives when seen as a result of pressurizing economic, political and domestic compulsions. This author is of the fervent opinion that the Kashmir issue per se is not going to be resolved at least until after the general elections in which case a change of heart may well be expected on either sides. Thus for all those wanting to see more in these peace efforts than there is, a word of caution; be prepared for the worst.
Up until September and the UN General Assembly any mention of bilateral talks were denied vehemently by both sides. Regularly stated arguments were resorted to at frequent intervals clearly belying any interest in the resolution of the Kashmir conundrum. However while all the parleys at the political level were discontinuing, at the economic level, the same were clearly intensifying. In September 2003 an India-Pakistan CEO’s Business Forum was launched by India’s Foreign Affairs minister Mr. Yashwant Sinha where he called for expanding bilateral trade between the two nations. Considering that unauthorized illegal trade between the two nations is estimated at $2 billion whereas legal trade is estimated to be a mere $200 – $250 million this proposal makes good economic sense. Pakistan follows a very restrictive trading regime versus India primarily as it links the issue of Kashmir with the normalization of any bilateral economic ties. Thus actual volumes of trade have always remained limited. Now however there appears to be a distinct change in the way issues are approached vis-à-vis Pakistan. It should be noted that this author had in a previous article mentioned the veritable fork in the road as far as bilateral relations with Pakistan is concerned. There is a willingness to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan, a composite dialogue as it were, with Kashmir being only one of the issues for discussions. At the same time the political plane between New Delhi and Srinagar is being leveled to a certain extent with the decision to hold high level talks with separatist amalgamations. That Kashmir, the issue, has been relegated as a secondary cause in the bureaucratic lexicon of both India and Pakistan would be too early to declare. But one can definitely assert that it no longer remains the only issue for consideration for bettering bilateral ties. Thus would it be so difficult to imagine that the imperatives for peace with Pakistan, over Kashmir and any other outstanding issues may actually be determined via economic prospects and the accruable advantages of the same? That the economics of peace would play a major role in the times to come has also been ascertained by reports that suggest that trade and economic issues would be a priority for India and Pakistan in their composite dialogue rather than Kashmir. Then again the improved economic ties should not pose a problem in the long run. One can always cite the example of China and Taiwan. For all practical purposes and for all the razor edge tensions between the two nations, China and Taiwan still maintain healthy economic relations. In fact statistics reveal that bilateral trade for these two nations rose by 25% thereby exceeding US$50 billion this year. Thus despite increasing tensions trade volumes for Taiwan have been steadily increasing. The enormity of these statistics does not reflect the fact that up until a decade ago no formal economic relations existed between these two neighbours. The signing of the free trade agreement or SAFTA at Islamabad is an indication that both India and Pakistan are ready to trade with each other. Thus it would not be wrong to speculate that the current peace efforts were being dictated by the accruable economic advantages for India and Pakistan rather than at efforts to settle Kashmir. Were it so then it would truly mark a departure from previous efforts of this administration.
But the economic imperatives may not be the only factor leading up to the talks. For each of the leaders in India and Pakistan there are various factors at stake in initiating bilateral dialogue at this stage. For one there may be this inherently logical reasoning which calls into question the need for a dialogue at this particular hour. After two almost fatal attacks on his life why would President Musharraf agree to talks with India, an act which may further anger the very people being suspected of being the masterminds behind the attacks? It could be theorized that for President Musharraf the only way to defy the militants and simultaneously assert his authority maybe to change tack on India and thereby Kashmir. As radical as it does sound this may well be one of the reasons that have resulted in the coming together of Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf at Islamabad. Then again there may have been little maneuverability for President Musharraf especially when Mr. Vajpayee declared that this may be his last attempt at forging peace between the two warring neighbours. Alternatively, skepticism would be paramount as to the timing of the sudden change of heart. Facing increasing criticism on the charges that Pakistan has been proliferating nuclear technology to countries like Iran, Libya and North Korea; this may well be an opportune time to show a change of heart on an issue as contentious as Kashmir and thereby Pakistan and General Musharraf’s sincerity in resolving other outstanding issues.
Similarly in India talks on Kashmir could well serve the electoral and policy compulsions of the NDA government. Speculations are awash in the media about the now almost certain postponement of general elections, initially slated for September 2004. Thus the peace talks with Pakistan on the one hand and the Hurriyat on the other would be shining examples of a ‘feel good’ factor of a different kind. Both when taken together will serve as an invaluable electoral manifesto that can promote the secularity of the BJP led NDA government. Fringe voters may thus be influenced on the apparent perception that peace with Pakistan and within Kashmir was possible after reelection.
When one insulates all the implications on a probable peace dialogue with Pakistan the recent peace forays tend to be understood better. The last such compelling factor for the peace initiatives may well have come from the American pressure on both nations to resolve the Kashmir issue or at least appear that they were close to resolving the same. Though not out rightly American presence and involvement in Kashmir has steadily and gradually been increasing. Statements from Mirwaiz Umer Farooq and Secretary of State Colin Powell himself have asserted that the United States has played an important role in facilitating the discussions between India and Pakistan. But to understand the extent of their involvement one just has to glance through the itinerary of diplomats visiting Kashmir in the past six odd months. The US deputy chief of missions and its current Charge d’ Affairs Robert-O-Blake was the first foreign dignitary to meet with the Chairman of the moderate Hurriyat faction in Srinagar. Besides a number of American delegates, from the State Department and otherwise had met and held consultations, with relevant groups, on Kashmir, in Delhi and Srinagar.
So this is what we have…the current peace initiatives when seen as a result of pressurizing economic, political and domestic compulsions. This author is of the fervent opinion that the Kashmir issue per se is not going to be resolved at least until after the general elections in which case a change of heart may well be expected on either sides. Thus for all those wanting to see more in these peace efforts than there is, a word of caution; be prepared for the worst.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Kashmir: New Hope?
The Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision to have Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani as the new person to be heading the talks with separatist outfits raises several questions. What had prompted the Government to finally involve a separatist outfit at the level of talks that the latter have been demanding for so long? And then what would be the status of talk’s vis-à-vis Pakistan especially after this peace initiative? This is an attempt to find out where this latest peace overture would leave us?
If one were to see the peace initiatives, against the backdrop of previous efforts by the Indian Government, then a distinct change between the past and current policies can be discerned. With previous policies Pakistan had been a factor as regards Kashmir. Initiatives were launched wherein it was imperative to involve Pakistan through dialogue irrespective of the fact that the initiative may not have eventually succeeded at all. The true essence of bilateralism, if not exploited, was explored in the past initiatives. But there is a perceptible fork on the road to Kashmir which symbolically has come to represent India’s changing strategy on Kashmir. On the one hand direct talks between separatist outfits between separatist outfits in Srinagar and New Delhi could prove to be a more successful approach as the issue of Kashmir is now going to be discussed with people from Kashmir. The latest impetus to the peace moves can be placed within this category.
The second component, in this figurative fork in the road, is that of ties between India and Pakistan. On the face of it a new impetus is being provided to peace in the region through normalization talks and peace proposals etc. But this is also being brought about by literally discussing, with Pakistan, everything under the sun except Kashmir. The twelve points, introduced by the Prime Minister, represent the latest proposals within this second component. The points themselves can be divided into economic, strategic and diplomatic factors which if accepted can be potentially advantageous for India. Thus while the ostensible reason is to promote people to people contact, so as to restore normalcy, the undertones of the proposed points cannot be missed. For instance economically India will have a lot going for it if the air links and over flights are reestablished. Similarly strategically and diplomatically also India would be better placed if a degree of accountability can be established with the Pakistani forces across the border especially through coast guard contacts.
The last aspect at this junction involves fairly long term approaches but options which are inherently achievable. India’s border talks with China can be placed within this reasoning and could imply in the long term, an attempt at resolving the issue of the 5000 sq km Aksai Chin territory that Pakistan ceded to China in March 1963. Thus the overall emphasis bluntly put is to continue with bilateral talks, regarding Kashmir, with actors other than Pakistan while simultaneously keeping Pakistan engaged on all matters except Kashmir. That the Pakistanis are not happy with the offer made also comes across through the official statement from the foreign office who expressed disappointment at India’s desire to discuss everything but the core issue of Kashmir.
The decision to have Deputy Prime Minister Shri Lal Krishna Advani directly interfacing with the Hurriyat Conference leaders is a decision that is loaded with implications. While it is highly unlikely that the Deputy Prime Minister is going to be involved in the absolutes of the discussions to be held, his presence will nonetheless remain symbolic at the least. For one it will be symbolic of New Delhi’s desire to continue engaging with all players in Kashmir while simultaneously also encouraging the separatists to come to the negotiating table by offering them the possibility of engaging with the Government at the highest possible level. Secondly Advani’s appointment is also important because greater maneuverability in decision making can be expected from him, something which the State’s previous interlocutors had not been able to achieve. Also were it to be so that Advani was not to succeed in his talks with the Hurriyat leaders, a higher court of appeal in Prime Minister Vajpayee still remained open as a foreseeable option. Lastly ideologically speaking any hard line approach, that the Hurriyat may come to adopt, can only be successfully cornered by L K Advani.
On the Hurriyat front the talks can be seen as an acknowledgement of their long stated demands of talks at the highest level but probably not of their desire to be acknowledged as the head of a de-facto nation. That the All Party Hurriyat Conference has recently broken into two factions headed by hardliner Geelani on the one hand and the moderate Maulvi Ansari on the other hand is also an important factor for the Government. The offer for talks can be seen as a recognition of the Ansari led Hurriyat faction which the Center has come to acknowledge as the Hurriyat that represents the ‘voice’ of the Kashmiri people, in contrast to the Geelani faction, which has been recognised for pretty much the same purpose by Pakistan. The offer has been made to the Hurriyat council per se but in what form will the Hurriyat council come to be represented only the events of the coming few days will show. If the Geelani faction does come on board and the talks fail the blame would not fall on the Government for in all respects they have attempted to engage the outfit. If the Geelani faction does not come on board then also the Government emerges on top as the offer had been made to the body of Hurriyat as such; Hurriyat without any specifications. Also they would have managed to disengage Geelani from all future talks effortlessly.
On the Hurriyat front the talks can be seen as an acknowledgement of their long stated demands of talks at the highest level but probably not of their desire to be acknowledged as the head of a de-facto nation. That the All Party Hurriyat Conference has recently broken into two factions headed by hardliner Geelani on the one hand and the moderate Maulvi Ansari on the other hand is also an important factor for the Government. The offer for talks can be seen as a recognition of the Ansari led Hurriyat faction which the Center has come to acknowledge as the Hurriyat that represents the ‘voice’ of the Kashmiri people, in contrast to the Geelani faction, which has been recognised for pretty much the same purpose by Pakistan. The offer has been made to the Hurriyat council per se but in what form will the Hurriyat council come to be represented only the events of the coming few days will show. If the Geelani faction does come on board and the talks fail the blame would not fall on the Government for in all respects they have attempted to engage the outfit. If the Geelani faction does not come on board then also the Government emerges on top as the offer had been made to the body of Hurriyat as such; Hurriyat without any specifications. Also they would have managed to disengage Geelani from all future talks effortlessly.
On the State government front the Center has clearly established the dominant power role that it plays vis-à-vis the State on Kashmir. Politically also this is an important issue as the BJP led Center has overshadowed the Congress-PDP led State government through its peace initiatives and contrary to their healing touch policy.
Lastly this peace proposal will reinforce not only within the state of Jammu and Kashmir but also internationally India’s stated position of wanting to resolve the Kashmir issue, as it were, through engagement and dialogue.
The growing Indo – US bilateral dialogue
For long, having been in the wilderness of the geo-political objectives of the United States, India is finally emerging as a strategic ally in its own right. In the aftermath of 9/11, and given India’s swift response to the tragedy, the United States has given renewed consideration to the possible role India could play in the geo-strategic politics of Asia with a key responsibility in the Indian subcontinent. Subsequently, a number of bilateral moves have been initiated, most prominently, in the fields of military, technology and counter terrorism operations. This growing strategic relationship between the world’s oldest and largest democracies was even articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, which recognized the conviction, which the United States imparted to developing a strengthened bilateral relationship with India.
The second term of President George Bush is widely seen as favorable for fostering these ties further. As has been interpreted from the various speeches that President Bush has made since his second inaugural, the focus this time round would definitely be on multi lateral initiatives. Furthermore, the members of his cabinet are known for their pragmatism and multilateral leanings. Then there is also the widely acclaimed but little followed - Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The potential of the NSSP for defining the Indo - US relations in the coming years, can be gauged with the immense progress that has been made since President Bush made the announcement in January 2004. But key events in the past few weeks have underlined that a mutual level of understanding still needs to be developed between the two countries. News of the decision by the United States to sell F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan came as a rude surprise to policy makers in India, especially since this decision was announced a few days after Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visit to India.
Juxtaposing the bonhomie over the NSSP with the confounding news of the sale of the F-16’s it becomes important to evaluate broader US foreign policy interests in the Indian subcontinent and the region. One of the first issues to consider would be the US presence that already exists in the subcontinent. A cursory glance at the map of India and its immediate neighbors shows considerable US presence (or influence) in the region. Therefore before one gauges Indo – US foreign policy, one must consider US foreign policy towards India’s neighbors.
A tentative step in this direction has been taken with the recent announcement that the United States was willing to sell advanced fighter aircrafts (F-16’s and F-18’s) to India while lifting the embargo on American firms bidding for Indian defense contracts. In addition the United States would also be willing to look at assisting India in generating nuclear energy. All these developments should be indicative of the growing bilateral and strategic dialogue between the two nations. The United States can further prove itself to be a dependable ally to India, something that has not been achieved in the past through sustained techno logistic support in the future. India, for its part, must not hyphenate this growing relationship with the United States vis-à-vis Pakistan.
If a strategic relationship has to be sustained between the two countries, or at least be acknowledged, as is the case with the NSSP, then significant steps need to be taken to sustain the NSSP. While the NSSP does signify the intent of the two countries, sustained efforts are needed from both sides, to move bilateral relations to a higher trajectory. It therefore becomes imperative that there be a convergence between the United States and India on issues that affect the interests of both nations in the immediate region and beyond. These collaborations could then become key strengths in the bilateral association.
In any event, Indo – US bilateral relations have come a long way and one can only expect a deepening of this relationship in the coming years.
The second term of President George Bush is widely seen as favorable for fostering these ties further. As has been interpreted from the various speeches that President Bush has made since his second inaugural, the focus this time round would definitely be on multi lateral initiatives. Furthermore, the members of his cabinet are known for their pragmatism and multilateral leanings. Then there is also the widely acclaimed but little followed - Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The potential of the NSSP for defining the Indo - US relations in the coming years, can be gauged with the immense progress that has been made since President Bush made the announcement in January 2004. But key events in the past few weeks have underlined that a mutual level of understanding still needs to be developed between the two countries. News of the decision by the United States to sell F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan came as a rude surprise to policy makers in India, especially since this decision was announced a few days after Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visit to India.
Juxtaposing the bonhomie over the NSSP with the confounding news of the sale of the F-16’s it becomes important to evaluate broader US foreign policy interests in the Indian subcontinent and the region. One of the first issues to consider would be the US presence that already exists in the subcontinent. A cursory glance at the map of India and its immediate neighbors shows considerable US presence (or influence) in the region. Therefore before one gauges Indo – US foreign policy, one must consider US foreign policy towards India’s neighbors.
A tentative step in this direction has been taken with the recent announcement that the United States was willing to sell advanced fighter aircrafts (F-16’s and F-18’s) to India while lifting the embargo on American firms bidding for Indian defense contracts. In addition the United States would also be willing to look at assisting India in generating nuclear energy. All these developments should be indicative of the growing bilateral and strategic dialogue between the two nations. The United States can further prove itself to be a dependable ally to India, something that has not been achieved in the past through sustained techno logistic support in the future. India, for its part, must not hyphenate this growing relationship with the United States vis-à-vis Pakistan.
If a strategic relationship has to be sustained between the two countries, or at least be acknowledged, as is the case with the NSSP, then significant steps need to be taken to sustain the NSSP. While the NSSP does signify the intent of the two countries, sustained efforts are needed from both sides, to move bilateral relations to a higher trajectory. It therefore becomes imperative that there be a convergence between the United States and India on issues that affect the interests of both nations in the immediate region and beyond. These collaborations could then become key strengths in the bilateral association.
In any event, Indo – US bilateral relations have come a long way and one can only expect a deepening of this relationship in the coming years.
Abu Ghraib: Lesson in Hypocrisy?
“An eye for an eye will make the whole world go blind”
The abuses perpetrated in the Abu Ghraib prison complex have yielded something that has so far been unfamiliar in the ongoing war on terrorism. The President of the United States has apologized as have several other top ranking civil and military officials. While the apologies were timed to coincide with Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, it has brought little or no sympathy for the Bush administration. There is a systematic framework behind these apologies and it has little to do with offering sympathy to the prisoners, who more often than not were ordinary Iraqi civilians. The Abu Ghraib prisons had long ago gained infamy under Saddam Hussein’s regime. It is indeed reprehensible that its worst characteristics continue to be perpetuated under the American liberators.
The prison abuses would have to be seen in their impact on America and the Arab world separately. Domestically the fallout of Abu Ghraib will spell real trouble for a President known for his straight talk, deep religious beliefs and conservative values. More importantly the Abu Ghraib prison photos would directly affect President Bush’ main re-election campaign plank, the war on terrorism, of which Iraq was an integral focus. This is even more damaging as the behaviour is quite obviously contrary to the stated platform of a US campaign aimed at bringing democracy and civil rights to Iraq. An extensive public relations campaign, both inside Iraq and within the United States, would have to be implemented to undo the fallout of Abu Ghraib. This is already underway with President Bush’s interview telecast live to two Arab channels. But the worst fallout for the US would be if the Abu Ghraib photos overshadow Saddam’s impending trial of war crimes.
Internationally the Arabs remain angry at the treatment being meted out by the Americans to the Iraqis. This has reinforced their feeling of resentment towards the presence of US forces in the greater Arab region. These photos could completely undo even the limited sympathy in the region over Saddam’s removal and appreciation for US actions. The distinguishing line between Saddam’s regime and the US led occupation of Iraq may get blurred if a positive spin cannot be given quickly to the US presence in Iraq. But while damage control may well be underway, it is not aimed only at soothing frayed sentiments domestically and internationally. The aim appears to be to cover up potentially more damaging accusations over the Abu Ghraib incident.
The photographs reveal not just violations of the Geneva Convention but also human rights violations of the most extreme kind. The violation of human rights has for long been the trump card for the United States to prevail over nations like China. Also this has for long been the one distinguishing factor between the American path of moral righteousness and the rest of the world. The Abu Ghraib prison photos may just blur the lines defining this gap. Thus in order to maintain their moral pre-eminence and prevent any accusations of human right abuses on the United States, long the self proclaimed champion of the same, the apologies will continue to come in fast and heavy.
The only person to gain from the entire incident is the presumptive Democratic nominee, Senator John F. Kerry. Long lampooned for projecting a multilateral approach to resolving American presence in Iraq, Kerry’s stand on Iraq was not winning him any laurels. This holds especially true for Mid–west America where President Bush’s policy statements on staying in Iraq were being seen as an example of his steadfastness and determination. The prison photos are likely to damage President Bush’s standing among the voters who are inclined to judge his performance based on policy and actions rather than be carried away by statements and appearances.
Ironically, what emerges from the Abu Ghraib prison abuse is not limited to the US and the Arab world. In a way it reveals the hypocrisy of today’s leaders who can go to any extreme to curry favour with the masses. Similar human rights abuses are probably being practiced with the same intensity in many other countries across the world. This incident could well serve as a much needed warning to the international community to seriously take up the issue of human rights abuses in other countries also.
The abuses perpetrated in the Abu Ghraib prison complex have yielded something that has so far been unfamiliar in the ongoing war on terrorism. The President of the United States has apologized as have several other top ranking civil and military officials. While the apologies were timed to coincide with Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, it has brought little or no sympathy for the Bush administration. There is a systematic framework behind these apologies and it has little to do with offering sympathy to the prisoners, who more often than not were ordinary Iraqi civilians. The Abu Ghraib prisons had long ago gained infamy under Saddam Hussein’s regime. It is indeed reprehensible that its worst characteristics continue to be perpetuated under the American liberators.
The prison abuses would have to be seen in their impact on America and the Arab world separately. Domestically the fallout of Abu Ghraib will spell real trouble for a President known for his straight talk, deep religious beliefs and conservative values. More importantly the Abu Ghraib prison photos would directly affect President Bush’ main re-election campaign plank, the war on terrorism, of which Iraq was an integral focus. This is even more damaging as the behaviour is quite obviously contrary to the stated platform of a US campaign aimed at bringing democracy and civil rights to Iraq. An extensive public relations campaign, both inside Iraq and within the United States, would have to be implemented to undo the fallout of Abu Ghraib. This is already underway with President Bush’s interview telecast live to two Arab channels. But the worst fallout for the US would be if the Abu Ghraib photos overshadow Saddam’s impending trial of war crimes.
Internationally the Arabs remain angry at the treatment being meted out by the Americans to the Iraqis. This has reinforced their feeling of resentment towards the presence of US forces in the greater Arab region. These photos could completely undo even the limited sympathy in the region over Saddam’s removal and appreciation for US actions. The distinguishing line between Saddam’s regime and the US led occupation of Iraq may get blurred if a positive spin cannot be given quickly to the US presence in Iraq. But while damage control may well be underway, it is not aimed only at soothing frayed sentiments domestically and internationally. The aim appears to be to cover up potentially more damaging accusations over the Abu Ghraib incident.
The photographs reveal not just violations of the Geneva Convention but also human rights violations of the most extreme kind. The violation of human rights has for long been the trump card for the United States to prevail over nations like China. Also this has for long been the one distinguishing factor between the American path of moral righteousness and the rest of the world. The Abu Ghraib prison photos may just blur the lines defining this gap. Thus in order to maintain their moral pre-eminence and prevent any accusations of human right abuses on the United States, long the self proclaimed champion of the same, the apologies will continue to come in fast and heavy.
The only person to gain from the entire incident is the presumptive Democratic nominee, Senator John F. Kerry. Long lampooned for projecting a multilateral approach to resolving American presence in Iraq, Kerry’s stand on Iraq was not winning him any laurels. This holds especially true for Mid–west America where President Bush’s policy statements on staying in Iraq were being seen as an example of his steadfastness and determination. The prison photos are likely to damage President Bush’s standing among the voters who are inclined to judge his performance based on policy and actions rather than be carried away by statements and appearances.
Ironically, what emerges from the Abu Ghraib prison abuse is not limited to the US and the Arab world. In a way it reveals the hypocrisy of today’s leaders who can go to any extreme to curry favour with the masses. Similar human rights abuses are probably being practiced with the same intensity in many other countries across the world. This incident could well serve as a much needed warning to the international community to seriously take up the issue of human rights abuses in other countries also.
Denial of visa to Narendra Modi and its aftermath
The aftermath of any event is always a good place to start adjudicating on an issue and event – simply because it gives one the advantage of hindsight. The denial of a visa to Narendra Modi, an elected head of state in democratic India, would obviously result in dividing public opinion on the man and the issue itself. But before one considers the monikers of ‘victim’ or ‘villain’ for Modi one must first read the facts in a clear and objective light.
The whole incident emerged when activists representing the ‘Coalition against Genocide’ drew the attention of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom to the purported role of the Gujarat government in the 2002 riots. I specifically use the word ‘purported’ for despite the statements and public perceptions, neither Narendra Modi nor the state Government apparatus have ever been indicted on charges specific to the Godhra riot. Nonetheless the efforts by the Coalition yielded results with the role of the Gujarat government finding mention in the Commission’s reports for two years running – in 2003 and 2004. Ironically the Commission cited the findings of our very own National Human Rights Commission’s (NHRC) report on the Godhra riots to reach its conclusion on Modi and the Gujarat government. Thus upon intimation of Modi’s impending visit to the United States and on the basis of the Commission’s report, the US State Department revoked Modi’s business and tourist visa under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 212 (A) (2) (G) which prohibits the entry of a person responsible for ‘particularly severe violations of religious freedom’.
With the pronouncement of the decision taken by the United States, statements of protest came from both the Centre and the State government and therein the public question of whether Narendra Modi is in fact the victim or the villain in these proceedings? One must consider the fact that the United States would not have taken this extreme step without informing the Government of India prior to the public announcement of their decision. That said it could also be assumed that the Government of India would have informed the Gujarat Chief Minister of the impending judgment on his visa application. The question that one must consider now is why Narendra Modi actually went ahead with the application after all in the first place? Knowing that his application would be rejected can’t it truly be said that Modi in fact went ahead with his plans merely to accrue political mileage out of the whole episode?
A cursory glance at newspaper headlines and the extent of media coverage this issue received reveals the scope of the mileage that Modi has indeed been able to derive out of this whole exercise. For one it clearly shows that besides being a divisive figure in national politics, he can still carry the media with him. The denial of the visa gave Modi the perfect opportunity to campaign and spell out his stand sans the Godhra backdrop, and this time, he was able to successfully portray himself as the victim rather than the villain. He even went out on a limb to woo the Muslim constituents of Gujarat by claiming that he ‘not against Islam but against Jihad’.
The Centre’s response to the whole episode was to wholly back Modi while expressing regret at the decision of the United States. I don’t think that there could have been any other way for the Government of India to react on this issue. If the GoI had distanced itself from the visa issue then Modi would have been inadvertently accorded more political mileage as he could have then claimed that New Delhi had let petty party politics affect the nation’s image. However supporting him may not exactly have been the right way either. The latest public relations strategy by the Gujarat government is in the form of a 47 - page booklet entitled ‘US refusal of visa to Shri Narendra Modi: India stands united’. A not so subtle indication of the stand that the Central government took on the issue came in the form of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s photograph next to Modi himself on the cover of the booklet.
This brings me back to my first point. Why did the United States feel impelled to refuse and revoke Narendra Modi’s visa? Had he gone to the United States, Narendra Modi would have been there in his own personal capacity, and not as the elected head of an Indian state. He was therefore neither representing Indians nor his electoral constituents in the state of Gujarat. Moreover why did the United States revoke Modi’s visa citing ‘violations of religious freedom’ especially since there is no registered case against him in any of the courts, charge sheeting him in connection with the Godhra riots. Public perceptions and subjective opinions of Modi apart, the enforcement agencies have not been able to prove his complicity in the Godhra riots in a comprehensive fashion. The decision by the United States becomes even more odd as they did not have any qualms in according L K Advani, a person who has cases pending against him in connection with the Ayodhya dispute and Babri Masjid demolition case, a reception normally reserved for visiting heads of state, when he last went to the United States in June of 2003.
All said and done it is obvious that there is more to what meets the eye in this whole episode. But one thing that can be said conclusively is that Narendra Modi has emerged with a lot more political mileage and gain, with the ensuing media circus, than he could have anticipated.
The whole incident emerged when activists representing the ‘Coalition against Genocide’ drew the attention of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom to the purported role of the Gujarat government in the 2002 riots. I specifically use the word ‘purported’ for despite the statements and public perceptions, neither Narendra Modi nor the state Government apparatus have ever been indicted on charges specific to the Godhra riot. Nonetheless the efforts by the Coalition yielded results with the role of the Gujarat government finding mention in the Commission’s reports for two years running – in 2003 and 2004. Ironically the Commission cited the findings of our very own National Human Rights Commission’s (NHRC) report on the Godhra riots to reach its conclusion on Modi and the Gujarat government. Thus upon intimation of Modi’s impending visit to the United States and on the basis of the Commission’s report, the US State Department revoked Modi’s business and tourist visa under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 212 (A) (2) (G) which prohibits the entry of a person responsible for ‘particularly severe violations of religious freedom’.
With the pronouncement of the decision taken by the United States, statements of protest came from both the Centre and the State government and therein the public question of whether Narendra Modi is in fact the victim or the villain in these proceedings? One must consider the fact that the United States would not have taken this extreme step without informing the Government of India prior to the public announcement of their decision. That said it could also be assumed that the Government of India would have informed the Gujarat Chief Minister of the impending judgment on his visa application. The question that one must consider now is why Narendra Modi actually went ahead with the application after all in the first place? Knowing that his application would be rejected can’t it truly be said that Modi in fact went ahead with his plans merely to accrue political mileage out of the whole episode?
A cursory glance at newspaper headlines and the extent of media coverage this issue received reveals the scope of the mileage that Modi has indeed been able to derive out of this whole exercise. For one it clearly shows that besides being a divisive figure in national politics, he can still carry the media with him. The denial of the visa gave Modi the perfect opportunity to campaign and spell out his stand sans the Godhra backdrop, and this time, he was able to successfully portray himself as the victim rather than the villain. He even went out on a limb to woo the Muslim constituents of Gujarat by claiming that he ‘not against Islam but against Jihad’.
The Centre’s response to the whole episode was to wholly back Modi while expressing regret at the decision of the United States. I don’t think that there could have been any other way for the Government of India to react on this issue. If the GoI had distanced itself from the visa issue then Modi would have been inadvertently accorded more political mileage as he could have then claimed that New Delhi had let petty party politics affect the nation’s image. However supporting him may not exactly have been the right way either. The latest public relations strategy by the Gujarat government is in the form of a 47 - page booklet entitled ‘US refusal of visa to Shri Narendra Modi: India stands united’. A not so subtle indication of the stand that the Central government took on the issue came in the form of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s photograph next to Modi himself on the cover of the booklet.
This brings me back to my first point. Why did the United States feel impelled to refuse and revoke Narendra Modi’s visa? Had he gone to the United States, Narendra Modi would have been there in his own personal capacity, and not as the elected head of an Indian state. He was therefore neither representing Indians nor his electoral constituents in the state of Gujarat. Moreover why did the United States revoke Modi’s visa citing ‘violations of religious freedom’ especially since there is no registered case against him in any of the courts, charge sheeting him in connection with the Godhra riots. Public perceptions and subjective opinions of Modi apart, the enforcement agencies have not been able to prove his complicity in the Godhra riots in a comprehensive fashion. The decision by the United States becomes even more odd as they did not have any qualms in according L K Advani, a person who has cases pending against him in connection with the Ayodhya dispute and Babri Masjid demolition case, a reception normally reserved for visiting heads of state, when he last went to the United States in June of 2003.
All said and done it is obvious that there is more to what meets the eye in this whole episode. But one thing that can be said conclusively is that Narendra Modi has emerged with a lot more political mileage and gain, with the ensuing media circus, than he could have anticipated.
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