Why a peaceful resolution to Kashmir seems improbable

It would not be fair to term Syed Salahuddin's statements on Kashmir as the official Pakistan policy. But the fact that Salahuddin has been making, rather freely, statements on Kashmir, which seem to be contrary to the stance taken by Islamabad-at least for the time being-is a clear pointer to Pakistan's strategy on Kashmir.

The first is to adopt a calibrated, if crude, flip-flop approach to the "K" issue. The second is to make diplomatically correct statements on Kashmir. Third, to keep the issue alive on a third front by letting people of all hues, from terrorists to commentators, to keep talking and writing about Kashmir. Pakistan has been quite successful in this approach. Kashmir, by and large, without being on the agenda of the SAARC conference, remained, throughout the past three days, the central theme of nuances, posturing and statements. Islamabad had fielded two players in this game. One official, another demi-official. Syed Salahuddin, the chief of Hizbul Mujahideen and the head of United Jihad Council, was the proxy. The official one was Pakistan's Information and Broadcasting Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad. Salahuddin has been holding forth on Kashmir rather vigorously since the peace initiative had begun. He clarified his views on the issue in a signed article in Nawa-i-Waqt and Ausaf, two of the most influential Urdu newspapers in Pakistan, a few days before the SAARC summit. He wrote there could be no peace in the world without solving the issue of Kashmir. He said the mujahideen should be given due credit for keeping the Kashmir struggle alive. He praised President Musharraf for extending moral and material support for the struggle and added, Pakistan should not make the past mistake of letting the people of Kashmir down by signing agreements like the Shimla Accord or Lahore Declaration. He said he was sure that President Musharraf would not let the people of Kashmir (read jihadis) down this time.

On January 5, 2004, on the second day of the summit, the Hizb leader said the SAARC nations should not ignore the ground realities and take steps to resolve the Kashmir issue "in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiris". He said that was the only path to peace. If Salahuddin was the only one making such noises, it would have been sensible to ignore him and his histrionics. But his official counterpart, Information and Broadcasting Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, too, has been echoing the same sentiments for quite some time.

On January 2, speaking to the media (reported in Ausaf) about the preparations for the SAARC conference, Mr. Rashid Ahmad said Kashmir was a question of life and death for Kashmiris. This statement was remarkably similar to the one made by President Pervez Musharraf sometime back, when he said Kashmir "runs in our blood". The Pakistanis do not even change the script. It would not be surprising if one were to look at what Mr. Rashid Ahmad has been saying in the run up to the SAARC conference. On December 23, for instance, speaking on behalf of President Musharraf, he declared that Pakistan was committed to resolving the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Talking to the Associated Press of Pakistan, the official news agency of that country, he said the President reiterated that Pakistan has a firm commitment to its principled position on Kashmir dispute. He quoted the President assuring a delegation of Kashmiri leaders that Pakistan would give due regard to the aspirations of the Kashmiri people whenever there is progress towards resolution of the Kashmir dispute. On January 5, the Minister said "the way leading to normalcy in India-Pakistan relations is passing through Kashmir" (Indian Express, January 6, 2004). Saying that friendship was in the mutual interest of India and Pakistan, he said the objective can be achieved only if the Kashmir issue was addressed.

Jang, a widely read English newspaper in Pakistan, quoted Mr. Rashid (Jan 6) as stating: "The issue of Kashmir involves three parties including India, Pakistan and Kashmiris. So the concerns of all parties have to be addressed to have a sustainable solution of the lingering dispute." He said the people of Kashmir have waited over a half-century for the solution of their problem and it will be unjust to make them wait further. Put these statements together and it would be easier to locate the common thread. Both are talking in the same vein. What they are saying is this: Peace is fine but not at the cost of Kashmir. It means the terror campaign would not be over. In fact, my suspicion is that the Army-jihadi network is already busy setting up new camps, pushing in weapons and explosives and training new recruits for renewed violence in Kashmir, once the hyped bonhomie of SAARC is over and India gears up for elections in spring. This is the time for the snow-bound passes to thaw. Remember 1999. There was similar hype, hoopla and declarations of friendship while General Musharraf was sending in his troops camouflaged as intruders.

There are indications this time round too about Pakistan's intentions in the near future. Don't hear, listen. Listen to what the General and his brigade is not saying. One, they are not saying there should not be terrorism in Kashmir. They are not even mentioning the word "terrorism".

For a country which is supposedly working with the United States in a war on terrorism, this amnesia is a matter of concern but not exactly unexpected. As the General said early this year at the United Nations, there was only "indigenous struggle" going on in Kashmir. Though everyone thought it appropriate to talk about the people of Kashmir, no one paid even a lip service to the hundreds and thousands of innocent civilians killed in Kashmir. They too were Kashmiris.

So which Kashmiri welfare is the General and his brigade talking about? Second, peace has become a catch word in Pakistan. From militant to the military, every one is talking about peace in south Asia. But, and here is the catchword, if only India could settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Hear Salahuddin or Mr Rashid or General Musharraf. That is the common refrain. The Pakistani propaganda machine has achieved another success. By provoking India to take an aggressive stance two years ago, Pakistan turned Kashmir into an international issue.

Now, it has queered the pitch by suffixing 'peace' to Kashmir. There would be peace if the Kashmir issue could be resolved. And the issue will only be resolved if India sits across the table with Pakistan to decide the fate of Kashmir. What should be our reaction? Shake hands with the General. Smile to the cameras. Talk peace. And ignore the bait. Don't react. Be extra alert at our borders. Plan a counter-proxy strategy for this summer. This would be a hot summer on, and inside, the Line of Control.

Mission Kashmir….well almost!

If anyone ever thought that a solution to the Kashmir problem was around the corner, the events of the past week may well convince them to think again.

In light of the growing bonhomie between India and Pakistan, President Musharraf invited the leaders of the separatists conglomerate, the Hurriyat conference, to Pakistan for talks. The Hurriyat on its part was pleased at the invitation it had received. For them it meant an increased role and greater prominence in any bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan. In fact, the Hurriyat had insisted on visiting Pakistan before resuming talks with India. For India, the visit of the Kashmiri separatist leaders to PoK, in the peace bus, would have translated into a fantastic public relations exercise. Symbolism travels a long way in politics and nothing would have been more symbolic and supportive of India’s recent initiatives on Kashmir than this. Unfortunately chaotic travels, contradicting statements and changing itineraries dominated the developments in the run up to the visit reflecting possibly the problems that hinder peace in the region.

The moderate Hurriyat leaders wanted this high profile visit to reassert their role in any dialogue on Kashmir, which may not be to New Delhi’s liking. For Pakistan, and especially President Musharraf, the visit would merely have been another opportunity to highlight their ‘support’ for the Kashmir cause. And this is where it all began to unravel, unfortunately, mostly for India.

The fact that the moderate leaders have indeed traveled from PoK to Islamabad, without legal travel documents, indicates the negation of India’s Kashmir policy. As opposed to New Delhi’s desire to have soft borders, the visit has instead prompted visions of alternative solutions wherein an autonomous state of Kashmir could be a possibility. In addition the bus service linking Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has been rendered completely irrelevant given the fact the Hurriyat leaders took all means of transport, excepting the bus, in their journeys. For instance instead of taking the peace bus to the Kaman bridge, the Hurriyat leaders opted instead to travel in their own cars to the last Indian outpost. These developments have to be seen against the background of India’s policy in the recent past when New Delhi had refused to even discuss the issue of Kashmir with the Hurriyat leaders, outside the purview of the Indian Constitution. It is not surprising that the Government has preferred to not comment on the Hurriyat’s visit and subsequent statements in Pakistan.

The events of the coming weeks would be even more interesting for all stakeholders. For the Government of India, dialogue with the Hurriyat leaders would probably be on the anvil upon their return and it would be interesting to see how the Government decides to approach the same. What would be even more important to note is the level at which the dialogue takes place, when it does. In the recent past when the Hurriyat had demanded direct consultations with the Prime Minister their request has not been acquiesced. Now with the Hurriyat returning from Pakistan, after holding face-to-face consultations with President Musharraf himself, India may have to consider a altering its strategy to regain some momentum in the changed scenario. After all it has become clear that if New Delhi does not court the Hurriyat, Islamabad would be more than willing to bridge the gap. The Hurriyat leaders on their part would be keen on making their presence felt as representatives of the Kashmiri people in New Delhi. Their only singular worry in a dialogue with India would be if no headway takes place in the dialogue process despite their visit.

In the midst of all the brouhaha there remains one tantalizingly interesting question to address – what means would the Mirwaiz and other Hurriyat leaders use to return to India and thereby Kashmir?

Centre and Hurriyat dialogue: Why now?

Days before the historic talks between the separatist amalgam, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference under the leadership of Maulana Ansari, and the Government of India, there is widespread speculation as to the outcome of the same. After all this is the first time that the Government of India has formally invited the APHC leaders for talks on Kashmir, a demand the latter has been making for a long time. So why agree to meet the APHC now, especially at a juncture when the status of talks with Pakistan on Kashmir, looks increasingly promising and therefore a more viable option? The nature and outcome of the talks can thus be predicted with almost a degree of certainty and here are the reasons why.

The primary reason to hold talks with APHC representatives is governed by the fact that in the past year or so the Government’s policy towards Kashmir has been dictated by its presence in the valley. There has been a concerted effort to showcase a different, more-friendly image, of the Union Government. The holding of the Inter State Chief Ministers Conference in Srinagar etc can be seen within the larger framework of promoting a more inclusive image of India per se; an image which includes Kashmir and Kashmiris in it. Thus the decision to engage the All Parties Hurriyat Conference for talks on Kashmir is not only unprecedented but also in line with their broader vision of promoting the Government’s presence, through alliances with mass based groups in the valley itself.

But why does the Government feel the urge to hold talks with the Hurriyat at this stage? There are two sides to the same issue which speak primarily of the compulsions facing the Government and the Hurriyat, rather than their collective desire to achieve a breakthrough. Their compulsions should be seen separately and then jointly to get a clear understanding of the reasons behind the talks.

For the Government of India emerging successfully from the talks with the Hurriyat would do more for the image for the BJP led NDA government in the upcoming general elections than anything else because of two reasons. For one successful talks with the Hurriyat would not result in a resolution on Kashmir but a possible resolution once the electoral process of 2004 is completed, could be proposed. This factor in itself would underscore the Government’s re election bid, for in order to achieve the breakthrough the BJP led NDA government would have to be reelected. In the same vein, as an electoral topic the holding of successful talks with the Hurriyat may well reflect the secular character of the Government as well. This is so because the talks would primarily showcase the sincerity of the Government’s efforts in resolving the Kashmir issue through successful engagement of the Hurriyat and Pakistan. Further, initiating a dialogue with the Hurriyat leadership is necessary as they are decidedly seen as being more moderate in their approach vis-à-vis the breakaway Geelani faction and therefore more open-minded.

Then there is the Hurriyat side of the coin. The APHC under Maulana Ansari’s leadership would want to appear reasonable yet principled in its stand on holding talks with the Government. As far as the latter case is concerned the Hurriyat’s principled position may be derived on the basis of three reasons. Firstly and primarily it may well arise from the acknowledgement of the fact that the Government would be faced with electoral compulsions to call the first such public dialogue with the separatist amalgam ‘a success’. Armed with this knowledge they may want to come to the talks with demands that are extreme from the Government’s point of view. After all any concessions that may be derived from the Government can be procured now. The success however would be in getting the Government of India to recognize the demands. Secondly, the APHC representatives would not want to appear as if they have sold out the interests of the Kashmiri people in New Delhi. Thirdly the representatives would also not want to appear ideologically weak towards the cause they propound, especially in light of the death threats that militant organisations have made towards them for having agreed to hold the talks.

Seen together there are compulsions on both sides to emerge successfully from the talks. There would be efforts, from both sides to find a common ground between them for a few reasons. For the Government it would be the desire to appear flexible and accommodating on the Kashmir front primarily so because they can push the claim through that they would be able to reach a consensus on the same if reelected. For the APHC on the other hand it would make sense to appear flexible yet hardline in their approach for two reasons. It is after all the first time the Government has heeded to their demands and agreed to hold a dialogue with representatives of the faction. As much as this meeting represents hope for the people of Kashmir it also represents the first time a component of the trilateral meet, desired by the APHC, would be realized. It would appear highly unlikely that the APHC, after having traversed this long road demanding talks, would want to return to status quo due to their failure to see eye to eye with the Government. Flexibility would thus mark their approach so that the continuity of talks is ensured.

After having observed the compulsions weighing on either side for entering into talks, it remains wise to hold off on expecting a breakthrough. Rather, what can be expected is a feel good factor emerging from the talks that would hopefully continue after the elections.