The largest of Pakistan’s four provinces, Balochistan is also the least developed and the least populated. Because of its sparse population it is ignored in federal fund allocation – accorded as it is on the basis of the census figures of a province. Further, despite being rich in mineral resources and natural gas, the province has been unable to ensure that benefits of this advantage accrue in its favour. For instance, even though gas from Sui district of Balochistan accounts for 38 percent of Pakistan’s supply, only 6 percent of the province’s population has access to it. Largely a tribal society, where the Bugti, Murri and Mengal tribes have been predominant, the province has of late also been witness to a demographic shift. A significant number of Pashtuns have travelled across the Afghan border in the wake of US intervention, resulting in the undermining of the one uniting factor – the socio-cultural identity that the tribals collectively imposed - in the province. This is the reality as it exists in Balochistan province of Pakistan today and it is primarily because of these socio-political and economic reasons that an uprising is being witnessed in the province.
The region’s present is not far removed from its past either. Recalcitrant and unwilling participants in the eventual composition of Pakistan, the people of the province have underlined their independent streak vis-à-vis the state on at least three different occasions in the country’s 58-year-old history. But the events of last year underline intensity and coordination that has so far not been witnessed in any of the previous confrontations of the Baloch nationalists against the state. For the first time the three different tribes have come together under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) banner to contest the writ of Islamabad in the province. Secondly, the leaders of the students’ agitation, witnessed in the 70’s, are leading the current unrest. Thirdly, the unrest is far more organised and well equipped than it has ever been in the past with the tactical understanding of the rebels becoming apparent through attacks on gas pipelines, army installations and other such areas of strategic relevance.
Oddly this unrest comes in the midst of major development projects that are in the pipeline in the province. The federal government had only recently sanctioned Rs. 140 billion for the development of roads and water reservoirs in the region. In addition the development of the Gwadar port is expected to bring in a lot of revenue for the region. However, it is these very development projects that have fuelled suspicion amongst tribal leaders over the designs of the federal government in the resource rich region. For one, the tribal leaders feel that the advantages of these projects would not benefit the region itself. Rather, they feel that the benefits would be reaped by Islamabad and to support their contention they point to several instances in the past. Second, tribal leaders are worried that the development of road networks linking the province with other parts of Pakistan will accord Islamabad greater presence in the region. The development of three more army installations in strategic areas reaffirms their suspicions. Third, there is a growing fear that the Balochis are being reduced to a minority in their own region, a trend that will grow with the development of the port and road networks. To this end tribal leaders point to the recent election results in the province where the dominant electorate of the Pashtuns voted the ultra right Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal into power. Therefore, there is a general awareness that the traditional political base is being slowly eroded.
Thus, fuelled by these suspicions, exemplified by events in the past, the tribal leaders are exploiting a developing ‘fear psychosis’ within the community in order to wage a growing conflict with the state of Pakistan. The goals that they hope to achieve with this fight are greater control over resources and more say in the development projects undertaken in the region. Taken together, the recent events in Balochistan do lead one to consider the growing strategic implications of violence, for the province, and for the state of Pakistan. Is this violence expected to spiral out of control leading to the break up of the state? And more importantly, could it be that this conflict be supported by India?
The answer to both these questions is a resounding no! Even if the violence does fester, eventually Islamabad and the tribal leaders are likely to arrive at a consensus that would benefit all. And even though the rebels are well armed and better organised it does not appear that they have India’s tacit support especially since bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been on the upswing. The foremost fall out of this conflict; besides human rights violations and delay of development projects in the province, would be the intensification of nationalist sentiments amongst the Balochis – something that will affect Pakistan in the long run.
The region’s present is not far removed from its past either. Recalcitrant and unwilling participants in the eventual composition of Pakistan, the people of the province have underlined their independent streak vis-à-vis the state on at least three different occasions in the country’s 58-year-old history. But the events of last year underline intensity and coordination that has so far not been witnessed in any of the previous confrontations of the Baloch nationalists against the state. For the first time the three different tribes have come together under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) banner to contest the writ of Islamabad in the province. Secondly, the leaders of the students’ agitation, witnessed in the 70’s, are leading the current unrest. Thirdly, the unrest is far more organised and well equipped than it has ever been in the past with the tactical understanding of the rebels becoming apparent through attacks on gas pipelines, army installations and other such areas of strategic relevance.
Oddly this unrest comes in the midst of major development projects that are in the pipeline in the province. The federal government had only recently sanctioned Rs. 140 billion for the development of roads and water reservoirs in the region. In addition the development of the Gwadar port is expected to bring in a lot of revenue for the region. However, it is these very development projects that have fuelled suspicion amongst tribal leaders over the designs of the federal government in the resource rich region. For one, the tribal leaders feel that the advantages of these projects would not benefit the region itself. Rather, they feel that the benefits would be reaped by Islamabad and to support their contention they point to several instances in the past. Second, tribal leaders are worried that the development of road networks linking the province with other parts of Pakistan will accord Islamabad greater presence in the region. The development of three more army installations in strategic areas reaffirms their suspicions. Third, there is a growing fear that the Balochis are being reduced to a minority in their own region, a trend that will grow with the development of the port and road networks. To this end tribal leaders point to the recent election results in the province where the dominant electorate of the Pashtuns voted the ultra right Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal into power. Therefore, there is a general awareness that the traditional political base is being slowly eroded.
Thus, fuelled by these suspicions, exemplified by events in the past, the tribal leaders are exploiting a developing ‘fear psychosis’ within the community in order to wage a growing conflict with the state of Pakistan. The goals that they hope to achieve with this fight are greater control over resources and more say in the development projects undertaken in the region. Taken together, the recent events in Balochistan do lead one to consider the growing strategic implications of violence, for the province, and for the state of Pakistan. Is this violence expected to spiral out of control leading to the break up of the state? And more importantly, could it be that this conflict be supported by India?
The answer to both these questions is a resounding no! Even if the violence does fester, eventually Islamabad and the tribal leaders are likely to arrive at a consensus that would benefit all. And even though the rebels are well armed and better organised it does not appear that they have India’s tacit support especially since bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been on the upswing. The foremost fall out of this conflict; besides human rights violations and delay of development projects in the province, would be the intensification of nationalist sentiments amongst the Balochis – something that will affect Pakistan in the long run.
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