November 15, 2003 can be seen as a red letter day for the task of nation building in Iraq for on this day the Agreement on Political Process was signed between the US led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). According to this agreement the CPA was to hand over civilian power to a sovereign Iraqi government by June 2004. The mission for the CPA and the IGC, laid out by this agreement, appears to be onerous, yet it is not the task at hand that ought to be examined rather the causes that called for a change in US led Coalition Authority’s vision of its long term presence in Iraq.
Firstly this agreement represents a complete turn around for the US led authority on its previously specified plan on presence in Iraq. Under the initial proposal by Paul Bremer, the return of self rule in Iraq was to have been the result of a long drawn process, spread over a period of four years and seven points. At the earliest this proposal sought the submission of a draft on how the constitution for Iraq ought to be drafted by December 2003. The November 15th agreement however specifies the transfer of power from the CPA to an interim Iraqi government earliest by June 2004. This turn around can be attributed to a number of reasons examined below.
The current US position is primarily a tacit acknowledgement of ground realities in Iraq. On the one hand it highlights the decline in domestic support for the US led occupation of Iraq primarily due to the mounting US casualties. On the other hand the agreement signals a change in the perception of the American ground forces in Iraq. This can be understood when the dynamics of the ethnically divisive population of Iraq is traced. For instance the Kurds in northern Iraq have long supported American presence and policies in Iraq. However they are adamant about incorporating their ideal version of federalism in the new Constitution to be framed for Iraq which would include an elected Parliament and a President. This stand of the Kurds, which juxtaposes their support of the US policies vis-à-vis their demands for a separate identity, could more importantly highlight the friction between the Kurds and the Shiites in the South. The Shiites, who constitute the largest ethnic population in Iraq, do not approve of the American presence in Iraq and any undue concessions to the Kurds would not be acceptable to them. Concern about accommodating the Shiites objections becomes more important as the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the preeminent religious authority of Shiites in Iraq, rejected the initial proposal of transferring power through a fatwa. Most recently the grand Ayatollah has issues a fatwa rejecting the legitimacy of the Iraqi Governing Council. Then there are the Sunnis of Iraq, living along the so called Sunni triangle of the country. Having long enjoyed preeminence under Saddam, they are now facing problems as a result of the de Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military. They remain potentially dangerous and armed and therefore need to be included in any constitutional framework being envisaged for Iraq.
Thus when seen in this perspective there appear to be essentially two prominent reasons which are weighing in on US presence in Iraq. On the one hand domestic support for the US occupation in Iraq seems to be withering and with no immediate support and the US presidential elections of 2004, a pullback or a pullout seems to be logical. Secondly the hurried pullback by the Americans can be attributed also to the changing dynamics within Iraq itself. The framework for transfer of power so laid out hurries the process. The hurried nature of this pullback may succeed in establishing a government in Iraq without accommodating all the concerns of the various ethnic groups. Most importantly however it will also ensure that the process of nation building in Iraq is perceived as a process being carri9ed out successfully by the people of Iraq for Iraq.
Firstly this agreement represents a complete turn around for the US led authority on its previously specified plan on presence in Iraq. Under the initial proposal by Paul Bremer, the return of self rule in Iraq was to have been the result of a long drawn process, spread over a period of four years and seven points. At the earliest this proposal sought the submission of a draft on how the constitution for Iraq ought to be drafted by December 2003. The November 15th agreement however specifies the transfer of power from the CPA to an interim Iraqi government earliest by June 2004. This turn around can be attributed to a number of reasons examined below.
The current US position is primarily a tacit acknowledgement of ground realities in Iraq. On the one hand it highlights the decline in domestic support for the US led occupation of Iraq primarily due to the mounting US casualties. On the other hand the agreement signals a change in the perception of the American ground forces in Iraq. This can be understood when the dynamics of the ethnically divisive population of Iraq is traced. For instance the Kurds in northern Iraq have long supported American presence and policies in Iraq. However they are adamant about incorporating their ideal version of federalism in the new Constitution to be framed for Iraq which would include an elected Parliament and a President. This stand of the Kurds, which juxtaposes their support of the US policies vis-à-vis their demands for a separate identity, could more importantly highlight the friction between the Kurds and the Shiites in the South. The Shiites, who constitute the largest ethnic population in Iraq, do not approve of the American presence in Iraq and any undue concessions to the Kurds would not be acceptable to them. Concern about accommodating the Shiites objections becomes more important as the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the preeminent religious authority of Shiites in Iraq, rejected the initial proposal of transferring power through a fatwa. Most recently the grand Ayatollah has issues a fatwa rejecting the legitimacy of the Iraqi Governing Council. Then there are the Sunnis of Iraq, living along the so called Sunni triangle of the country. Having long enjoyed preeminence under Saddam, they are now facing problems as a result of the de Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military. They remain potentially dangerous and armed and therefore need to be included in any constitutional framework being envisaged for Iraq.
Thus when seen in this perspective there appear to be essentially two prominent reasons which are weighing in on US presence in Iraq. On the one hand domestic support for the US occupation in Iraq seems to be withering and with no immediate support and the US presidential elections of 2004, a pullback or a pullout seems to be logical. Secondly the hurried pullback by the Americans can be attributed also to the changing dynamics within Iraq itself. The framework for transfer of power so laid out hurries the process. The hurried nature of this pullback may succeed in establishing a government in Iraq without accommodating all the concerns of the various ethnic groups. Most importantly however it will also ensure that the process of nation building in Iraq is perceived as a process being carri9ed out successfully by the people of Iraq for Iraq.
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