Ever since the ceasefire almost two years ago along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, speculation has been rife on a) whether this ceasefire would finally result in the brokering of a lasting peace between the two neighbours; b) what would be the nature of a final solution and c) how long would it take for this solution to materialize? Besides this, there has always been the constant worry over India’s threshold for cross border terrorism and whether or not it would succeed in derailing this peace process.
India’s focus since the ceasefire has been to keep Pakistan engaged on two fronts – one, by ensuring continued dialogue on a number of fronts in the form of confidence building measures and two, engaging with Islamabad on Kashmir specific issues. The results for both have been significant. The former has helped bridge the trust discrepancy between the two neighbours and the latter has aided in highlighting the two neighbours ability to work on contentious bilateral issues. The difference between India and Pakistan however has been over the pace with which the two countries approach discussions. For India, the developments should be gradual, a point indicative in its stand for first building trust through CBM’s, whereas for Pakistan an earlier resolution to this issue seems acceptable.
The disclosure that Pakistani Prime Minister had made a proposal for self-governance along the sidelines of the SAARC summit to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had only increased speculation about the aforementioned three questions. It is another matter of course that the Indian side dismissed the proposal, albeit on grounds of official modalities. But before one considers the reasons behind New Delhi’s rejection of the proposal, the ‘Musharraf proposal’ as it is being called must be studied.
This is not the first time that President Musharraf has made statements on what would constitute a viable solution for Kashmir. In fact approximately a year back he had made proposals that called for the identification of seven regions from the erstwhile state – two in Pakistan and five in India – which would then be demilitarized and their status changed. This proposal was summarily rejected by India because it would have meant the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines. A year on, the proposal from Pakistan does not seem all that much different. The Musharraf proposal in essence calls for the division of the state into five geographical entities, demilitarizing them and according them maximum self-governance. Thus besides the reduction in the number of regions that needed to be demilitarized, the new addition in this proposal is the concept of self-governance. In fact the roots for this new proposal can be found in the US based Kashmir Study Group’s report of February 2005 on solutions for Kashmir. The report of 2005 is itself a departure from its report released in 2000 wherein it had called for the division of the state into 7 regions – a concept now popularized through President Musharraf’s suggestion.
On the face of things, it appears that the new proposal cannot be dismissed so easily since the projected self-governance probably comes closest to New Delhi’s stated desire of extending ‘maximum self-autonomy’ to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But there remain numerous reasons for India to reject this proposal from Pakistan.
For one, even if the proposal calls for the establishment of five and not seven entities, the division in Jammu and Kashmir would still take on communal overtones. In the previous proposal, the division of the regions was along religious lines was overt. If considered, the new proposal still manages the division of the state into a Muslim Kashmir, a Hindu Jammu and a Buddhist Ladakh. This arrangement would never be acceptable to New Delhi in any eventuality. Secondly, the increased infiltration from across the border, in the wake of the devastating earthquake and especially in the face of India’s aid to Pakistan, has not helped bridge the trust factor. To acknowledge a proposed solution in the face of increased infiltration would negate India’s stand on cross border terrorism and portray New Delhi as weak. Thirdly, the call for demilitarization of the region, as the proposal suggests can never materialize if cross border terrorism continues. So the actions from across the border contradict the proposal themselves. Fourthly, India’s stand on soft borders would at least ensure its continued sovereignty over the state – a concept not possible under the proposal. Lastly, the proposal still does not take into account the wishes of the people from Jammu and Ladakh – two of the three regions from India – who have consistently called for greater integration with New Delhi.
Thus from all conceivable angles, a proposal in this form, could never be accepted by India. However, New Delhi will soon need to devise its own framework for a solution rather than merely rejecting a formal submission of one from Islamabad especially since reports from Pakistan suggest that President Musharraf is in no hurry to yield on this ‘solution’ any time soon.
India’s focus since the ceasefire has been to keep Pakistan engaged on two fronts – one, by ensuring continued dialogue on a number of fronts in the form of confidence building measures and two, engaging with Islamabad on Kashmir specific issues. The results for both have been significant. The former has helped bridge the trust discrepancy between the two neighbours and the latter has aided in highlighting the two neighbours ability to work on contentious bilateral issues. The difference between India and Pakistan however has been over the pace with which the two countries approach discussions. For India, the developments should be gradual, a point indicative in its stand for first building trust through CBM’s, whereas for Pakistan an earlier resolution to this issue seems acceptable.
The disclosure that Pakistani Prime Minister had made a proposal for self-governance along the sidelines of the SAARC summit to Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had only increased speculation about the aforementioned three questions. It is another matter of course that the Indian side dismissed the proposal, albeit on grounds of official modalities. But before one considers the reasons behind New Delhi’s rejection of the proposal, the ‘Musharraf proposal’ as it is being called must be studied.
This is not the first time that President Musharraf has made statements on what would constitute a viable solution for Kashmir. In fact approximately a year back he had made proposals that called for the identification of seven regions from the erstwhile state – two in Pakistan and five in India – which would then be demilitarized and their status changed. This proposal was summarily rejected by India because it would have meant the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines. A year on, the proposal from Pakistan does not seem all that much different. The Musharraf proposal in essence calls for the division of the state into five geographical entities, demilitarizing them and according them maximum self-governance. Thus besides the reduction in the number of regions that needed to be demilitarized, the new addition in this proposal is the concept of self-governance. In fact the roots for this new proposal can be found in the US based Kashmir Study Group’s report of February 2005 on solutions for Kashmir. The report of 2005 is itself a departure from its report released in 2000 wherein it had called for the division of the state into 7 regions – a concept now popularized through President Musharraf’s suggestion.
On the face of things, it appears that the new proposal cannot be dismissed so easily since the projected self-governance probably comes closest to New Delhi’s stated desire of extending ‘maximum self-autonomy’ to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But there remain numerous reasons for India to reject this proposal from Pakistan.
For one, even if the proposal calls for the establishment of five and not seven entities, the division in Jammu and Kashmir would still take on communal overtones. In the previous proposal, the division of the regions was along religious lines was overt. If considered, the new proposal still manages the division of the state into a Muslim Kashmir, a Hindu Jammu and a Buddhist Ladakh. This arrangement would never be acceptable to New Delhi in any eventuality. Secondly, the increased infiltration from across the border, in the wake of the devastating earthquake and especially in the face of India’s aid to Pakistan, has not helped bridge the trust factor. To acknowledge a proposed solution in the face of increased infiltration would negate India’s stand on cross border terrorism and portray New Delhi as weak. Thirdly, the call for demilitarization of the region, as the proposal suggests can never materialize if cross border terrorism continues. So the actions from across the border contradict the proposal themselves. Fourthly, India’s stand on soft borders would at least ensure its continued sovereignty over the state – a concept not possible under the proposal. Lastly, the proposal still does not take into account the wishes of the people from Jammu and Ladakh – two of the three regions from India – who have consistently called for greater integration with New Delhi.
Thus from all conceivable angles, a proposal in this form, could never be accepted by India. However, New Delhi will soon need to devise its own framework for a solution rather than merely rejecting a formal submission of one from Islamabad especially since reports from Pakistan suggest that President Musharraf is in no hurry to yield on this ‘solution’ any time soon.
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